Sempena dgn Bersih 2.0 pd 9/7/2011 aku post di sini kertas kerja drpd seorang Hakim yg aku amat hormati yg aku pernah beberapa kali hadir di hadapan beliau.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MALAYSIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM*
by
DATO' ABDUL MALIK ISHAK**
I have the honour and the singular privilege of presenting this paper to this august gathering of international jurists, human rights advocates and legal luminaries.
In Malaysia, there is a universal concept of justice. We respect human life and we treat criminals justly and in accordance with law. We have attained a national system of justice for all. We do not exercise multiple justices. Everyone is equal before the law.
Our law has been fair and it is in accordance with human rights standards. We are very clear on this. It is for the well being of all Malaysians and for those who come to Malaysia.
Malaysia is a democratic country. The essential elements of democracy include respect for human rights and fundamental liberties. The link between democracy and human rights would be the rule of law. We are acutely aware of the need to administer the law peppered with human rights principles.
Even the Malaysian Government has acknowledged the importance of a national human rights commission to further promote and protect human rights in Malaysia. Towards this end, the Malaysian Government has set up SUHAKAM in the year 2000 via the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 (Act 597) (hereinafter referred to as the "Human Rights Act").
Briefly, the main functions of SUHAKAM are as follows:
(i) to promote awareness and provide education in relation to human rights;
(ii) to advise and assist the Government in formulating legislations and administrative directives and procedures and recommend the necessary measures to be taken;
(iii) to recommend to the Government to subscribe to certain treaties and other international instruments in the field of human rights; and
(iv) to enquire into complaints regarding infringements of human rights.
The phrase "human rights" is defined in s. 2 of the Human Rights Act by making reference:
to fundamental liberties as enshrined in Part II of the Federal Constitution.
Articles 5 to 13 of the Federal Constitution are found in Part II of the said Constitution. Article 5 makes reference to the liberty of the person. Article 6 talks of the prohibition of slavery and forced labour. Article 7 refers to the protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials. According to art. 8 all persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law. Article 9 states that no citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Federation. Article 10 talks of freedom of speech, assembly and association. Whereas art. 11 allows freedom of religion. And art. 12 makes reference to the rights in respect of education. Finally, the rights to property can be found in art. 13.
It is the law that "an accused person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty" (Yaakub bin Ahmad v. Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 223, 224). And the Federal Constitution guarantees the right to be heard, the right to be defended by counsel of his or her choice as well as the right to a fair trial.
Two very important constitutional principles are contained in art. 5(3) of the Federal Constitution. The first would be in regard to the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as may be. Such constitutional right must be accorded in all cases of arrest irrespective of the statute under which the arrest was made. However, there may be occasions where this is not possible or it may not be necessary as stated by the House of Lords in Christie And Another v. Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 and cited with approval by the Federal Court in Abdul Rahman v. Tan Jo Koh [1967] 1 LNS 1. The circumstances may be stated as follows:
(i) where the arrested person must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he is arrested particularly when he is caught red handed; and
(ii) where the arrested person creates a situation which makes it practically impossible to inform him - two examples need to be mentioned here, firstly, where the arrested person resists arrest by attacking the officer and, secondly, where the arrested person evades arrest by running away.
The second important constitutional principle concerns the right to counsel. That right appears to be an absolute right. According to the case of Saul Hamid Pakir Mohamed v. Public Prosecutor [1987] 2 CLJ 257; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 967, an arrested person has a right to be represented by a legal practitioner under remand proceedings before a Magistrate under s. 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code, unless the police can discharge the onus of satisfying the Magistrate that to allow the arrested person to exercise that right would result in undue interference in the course of investigation.
In Malaysia, when a case is brought before the court, the skill of the lawyers will be brought into play in that the outcome of the case would be dependent on the expertise of the lawyers in creating a reasonable doubt or establishing a technical flaw in the prosecution's case in order to secure an acquittal for the accused. And, on appeal, the appellate court may disagree entirely with the initial verdict and may substitute the acquittal with a conviction. This certainly speaks well for the process of justice in Malaysia.
The courts in Malaysia have administered the law effectively and promptly without distinction of any kind. We are not influenced by race, colour, gender, religion, language, political affiliation, national or social origin, accident of birth or any other factors. We administer the law fairly and without prejudice. All persons are entitled to equal protection of the law.
Judges and Magistrates hand down their decisions based on their own reasonings without outside interferences. All decisions are decided based on the evidence and the law. The Malaysian Judiciary uphold the rule of law vigorously. We are aware of the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 which states, inter alia, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.
According to the late Justice Arulanandom in Re P.E. Long @ Jimmy & Ors; P.E. Long & Ors. v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors. [1976] 2 MLJ 133, 134, the question of deprivation of liberty in art. 5 of the Federal Constitution requires strict compliance with the law.
In Re Datuk James Wong Kim Min; Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors. v. Datuk James Wong Kim Min [1976] 1 LNS 129, the late Lee Hun Hoe CJ (Borneo), speaking for the Federal Court, laid down the law lucidly in this way:
In a matter so fundamental and important as the liberty of the subject, strict compliance with statutory requirements must be observed in depriving a person of his liberty. The material provisions of the law authorising detention without trial must be strictly construed and safeguards which the law deliberately provides for the protection of any citizen must be liberally interpreted. Where the detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by the law, the detention is bad and the person detained is entitled to be released forthwith. Where personal liberty is concerned an applicant in applying for a writ of habeas corpus is entitled to avail himself of any technical defects which may invalidate the order which deprives him of his liberty.
The detainee was released by the court in Re Datuk James Wong Kim Min.
In Andrew s/o Thamboosamy v. Superintendent of Pudu Prisons, Kuala Lumpur [1976] 2 MLJ 156, 158, the Lord President of the then Federal Court, Suffian LP, writing for the Federal Court succinctly said:
With respect, we agree that any form of detention does violence to section 5(1) of the Constitution which reads:
5(1) No person shall be deprived of his ... personal liberty save in accordance with law.
and hence power given by law to detain must be construed strictly and in cases of doubt or ambiguity the court should lean in favour of the subject. Government is the most powerful body in the country and the court should be vigilant to see that Government does not exceed its power when dealing with individuals. But at the same time we are of the opinion that the problem of dealing with illegal immigrants is a matter of public policy to be decided by Parliament and by the Executive, that in this matter the proper authority for enacting the necessary legislation is Parliament and that if the Government exercises a power conferred on it by Parliament and keeps within the law, then the duty of the court is quite clear; the court should simply apply the law, no matter how harsh its effect may be on the immigrant. His remedy is then not judicial, but political and administrative.
Clause (1) of art. 5 of the Federal Constitution states that, "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law". According to the Federal Court in Government of Malaysia & Ors v. Loh Wai Kong [1979] 2 MLJ 33, the words "personal liberty" in cl. (1) of art. 5 does not include the right to travel overseas or the right to a passport. In delivering the judgment of the court, Suffian LP said at p. 36 that "... a citizen ... does not have a right, not even a qualified right, to a passport ..." And his Lordship continued to say that "... the issue of a passport is, ... only a privilege ... The Executive has a discretion whether or not to issue a passport." But, his Lordship added further that, "If it is established that Government has acted mala fide or has in other ways abused this discretionary power, the court may, ... review Government's action and make the appropriate order ..."
In Attorney-General, Malaysia v. Chiow Thiam Guan [1983] 1 CLJ 27; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 462, Hashim Yeop Sani J, held that if Parliament deems it necessary that the death penalty should be mandatory for a person convicted under s. 57(1) of the Internal Security Act neither art. 5(1) nor art. 8 of the Federal Constitution would bar the sentence from being imposed.
Interestingly, Ajaib Singh J, in PP v. Yee Kim Seng [1983] 1 CLJ 38; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 824 held that the Internal Security Act was a perfectly valid law passed by Parliament. At p. 826, His Lordship said that, "art. 5(1) ... is not infringed because the accused is not going to be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with law".
It is comforting to know that a death row convict has still recourse to seek a pardon. This is provided for in art. 42 of the Federal Constitution which deals with the powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the Rulers and Governors to grant pardons, reprieves and respites to convicted death row prisoners. This must surely be another human rights norm.
All the judges in Malaysia honourably carry out their tasks by giving recognition to the fundamental values of liberty, equality and justice. It is correct to say that the Malaysian Judiciary is not a monolithic institution. Currently, there are 175 Magistrates, 118 Sessions Court Judges, 38 Judicial Commissioners, 47 High Court Judges, 20 judges in the Court of Appeal and 5 Federal Court judges excluding the top four heads of the Judiciary. They are all independent and competent to decide on any issue that may crop up.
Superior Court Judges have each taken their oath of office that they will faithfully discharge their judicial duties to the best of their ability and that they will bear true faith and allegiance to Malaysia and will preserve and defend its Constitution.
When we talk about justice, we directly bring with it the whole array of legislations and the way in which they are implemented. We also recognise that human rights, in the context of the administration of justice, is not simple and straightforward. It is both complex and challenging. It encompasses a wide field. However, it is quite easy to integrate human rights into the structures and practices of any judicial system. The pertinent question to ask is this: What do we understand by the concept of human rights? Broadly speaking, it concerns the plight of the people.
Notwithstanding the definition of "human rights" in s. 2 of the Human Rights Act as alluded to earlier, some sceptics may argue that human rights cover a wider field and have no limits and are absolute and that it should be preserved at all costs. Others would argue otherwise.
A fair and an effective administration of justice are the hallmarks of the rule of law. Firstly, it is a well established human rights norm that any individual must have unrestricted and effective right of access to the courts to establish his or her rights against the State and its agencies. A classic example would be the case of an individual who is unlawfully arrested and detained by the police. That individual has the right to gain access to the court to obtain his or her release by an urgent writ of habeas corpus application. But a writ of habeas corpus will not lie in respect of an accused who has been tried, convicted and sentenced by a court of competent jurisdiction (Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1999] 1 CLJ 481, CA). In Malaysia, the right of unimpeded access to the courts exist notwithstanding that the outcome may be negative and this means that Malaysia has satisfied the human rights norm. Secondly, another human rights norm is this. That every individual has a right to a fair trial in both civil and criminal cases before an independent and impartial judge.
In Malaysia, a judge decides according to the facts and the law. And when a judge decides, one party is bound to be dissatisfied. You cannot please everyone. Sometimes, both parties are not satisfied and, if this happens, the Rules provide for cross-appeals. This is quite common in Malaysia. When this happens, it can be said that the Malaysian Judiciary is independent.
If a law is unconstitutional, the court should strike it out. And if an Executive act is unlawful, the court should not hesitate to quash it. In my view, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary should act in accordance with law.
There is a paradigm shift in favour of applying human rights principles within the Malaysian Judiciary. Two cases that relate to native customary rights such as Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor v Adong Kuwau & Ors [2002] 4 CLJ 259; and Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors v. Sagong Tasi & Ors [2005] 4 CLJ 169, are classic examples of that paradigm shift.
In Adong Kuwau, the Federal Court speaking through Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ affirmed the quantum of RM40,000 for getting up and also awarded interest even though it was not specifically claimed. The judgment was handed down in favour of each of the 52 aborigines.
Gopal Sri Ram JCA writing for the Court of Appeal in Sagong bin Tasi aptly said at p. 182, "... that the fact that the radical title to land is vested in the Sovereign or the State (as is the case here) is not an ipse dixit answer to a claim of customary title". And at p. 185, his Lordship said:
Now, the extrinsic material to which I have referred makes it abundantly clear that the purpose of the 1954 Act was to protect and uplift the First Peoples of this country. It is therefore fundamentally a human rights statute. It acquires a quasi constitutional status giving it pre-eminence over ordinary legislation. It must therefore receive a broad and liberal interpretation.
No one should be condemned unless he or she has been fairly tried in accordance with law. And when the court quashes a conviction obtained after an unfair trial, the right to a fair trial will be affirmed and vindicated.
The existence of the rule of law demands that the Judiciary should be independent and impartial. There is no place for judicial independence in an authoritarian State. Fortunately, in Malaysia the rule of law prevails.
A fair pre-trial disclosure too ought to be recognised as a universal human rights norm. And that must be left to the discretion of the prosecution to decide whether to disclose to the defence all relevant information which has a bearing in the case. Ultimately it is the court who has to be the final arbiter whether to allow disclosure or otherwise.
With that, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you.
Endnotes:
* This paper was presented by the author at the Judicial Colloquium On The Domestic Application Of International Human Rights Norms organised by the OHCHR Regional Office for South East Asia on 23 to 25 March 2009 held in Bangkok, Thailand. The Malaysian delegation was led by the Right Honourable Tan Sri Dato' Seri Zaki bin Tun Azmi, Chief Justice of Malaysia accompanied by the author together with YA Dato' Ahmad bin Haji Maarop JCA, YA Dato' Rohana binti Yusof J, YA Puan Rhodzariah binti Bujang JC, and Tuan Syed Adam Alhabshi (Special Officer to the Chief Justice).
** Judge Court of Appeal.
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
Thursday, June 9, 2011
Friday, June 3, 2011
Cabaran TKP PAS
Tahniah kpd Nik Abduh yg menang jawatan Timbalan Ketua Pemuda PAS baru baru ini.Kemenangan ini sedikit se
Banyak di dorong oleh nama besar dibawa oleh Nik Abduh itu sendiri.Walau apapun sebab perwakilan memilih beliau dlm pertandingan empat penjuru ini sudah tidak penting tetapi ahli ahli dan umum akan melihat apakah peranan dan tanggungjawab yg akan dipegang dan dibawa oleh beliau selepas ini khususnya dlm menghadapi PRU13.
Dengan report card yg sederhana sebelum ini apakah beliau mampu untuk menggerakkan pemuda ke arah yg lebih progresif utk memenangi PRU13 yg jelas kini boleh dicapai.Ramai yg takut jika hasrat besar ini tidak kesampaian dan akhirnya beliau hanya dipetiaiskan shj oleh KP yg menang tanpa bertanding setelah pencabar beliau menarik diri.Adakah pencabar KP ini sebenarnya di cah keting hanya Allah Taala yg tahu walaupun ada suara suara sumbang berbisik begitu.
Penulis juga ingin menunggu dan melihat adakah KP akan meminta kerusi selamat ketika PRU13 nanti sesuai dgn jawatan Ketua yg dipegang beliau.
Pemilihan telah selesai maka diharapkan team baru ini akan terus memulakan gerakkerja khususnya dlm menghadapi PRU13 dan mengeratkan hubungan kerjasama di dlm Pakatan spt ditekankan oleh Tuan Guru Presiden dlm ucapan semalam.
Banyak di dorong oleh nama besar dibawa oleh Nik Abduh itu sendiri.Walau apapun sebab perwakilan memilih beliau dlm pertandingan empat penjuru ini sudah tidak penting tetapi ahli ahli dan umum akan melihat apakah peranan dan tanggungjawab yg akan dipegang dan dibawa oleh beliau selepas ini khususnya dlm menghadapi PRU13.
Dengan report card yg sederhana sebelum ini apakah beliau mampu untuk menggerakkan pemuda ke arah yg lebih progresif utk memenangi PRU13 yg jelas kini boleh dicapai.Ramai yg takut jika hasrat besar ini tidak kesampaian dan akhirnya beliau hanya dipetiaiskan shj oleh KP yg menang tanpa bertanding setelah pencabar beliau menarik diri.Adakah pencabar KP ini sebenarnya di cah keting hanya Allah Taala yg tahu walaupun ada suara suara sumbang berbisik begitu.
Penulis juga ingin menunggu dan melihat adakah KP akan meminta kerusi selamat ketika PRU13 nanti sesuai dgn jawatan Ketua yg dipegang beliau.
Pemilihan telah selesai maka diharapkan team baru ini akan terus memulakan gerakkerja khususnya dlm menghadapi PRU13 dan mengeratkan hubungan kerjasama di dlm Pakatan spt ditekankan oleh Tuan Guru Presiden dlm ucapan semalam.
Monday, May 30, 2011
Local Authority
[1998] 5 CLJ 367
LEE HAY v. YANG DI PERTUA MAJLIS DAERAH HULU LANGAT & ANOR
HIGH COURT MALAYA, SHAH ALAM
FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J
[SUIT NO: 22-81-93]
25 FEBRUARY 1998
[Order in terms of plaintiff's application.]
Kes yg menarik
LEE HAY v. YANG DI PERTUA MAJLIS DAERAH HULU LANGAT & ANOR
HIGH COURT MALAYA, SHAH ALAM
FAIZA TAMBY CHIK J
[SUIT NO: 22-81-93]
25 FEBRUARY 1998
[Order in terms of plaintiff's application.]
Kes yg menarik
Had Masa Buat KWSP
LEMBAGA KUMPULAN WANG SIMPANAN PEKERJA v. CARIMONDE SDN BHD & ORS
HIGH COURT, PENANG
VARGHESE GEORGE VARUGHESE JC
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: 12A-403-2010]
31 JANUARY 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT PENANG
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: 12A-403-2010]
BETWEEN
LEMBAGA KUMPULAN WANG SIMPANAN PEKERJA
... Appellant
AND
1. CARIMONDE SDN BHD
... Respondents
2. SOO BENG CHENG
3. TEH BENG CHNEAH
GROUNDS OF DECISION
1. This was an appeal by the Appellant/Plaintiff (Plaintiff) against the Learned Session Judge's decision of 12.05.2010 striking out the Summon and Statement of Claim on the grounds that the Plaintiff's action was statute-barred. No 'Alasan Penghakiman' was available but it appears that the Sessions Judge was persuaded to do so on an oral application of the Respondents/Defendants (Defendants), on the grounds that the Plaintiff, regardless of sections 46 (1) and 65 (1) of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1991 (EPF Act), was not exempted from the statutory force of the Limitation Act 1953 (LAct).
Background
2. The Plaintiff commenced an action at the Session Court on 21.07.2006 to recover jointly and severally from the Defendants what is alleged to be unremitted contributions for the employees of the 1st Defendant for the period July 1999 to October 2000 (arrears), together with certain "dividends' and "interest" accruing upon the said sum in arrears. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants were the Directors of the 1st Defendant.
3. The Defendants had on 27.10.2006 filed a Statement of Defence to the said claim.
4. In May 2007 the Plaintiff proceeded to file an application pursuant to Order 26A of SCR 1980 for summary judgment to be entered against all the Defendants in the action. However before that application was dealt with, the Plaintiff filed applications to amend the Statement of Claim and also to amend the Order 26A application via Kandungan 8 (21.05.2007) and Kandungan 10 (31.05.2007), respectively.
5. In response to the Plaintiffs applications, the 3rd Defendant, on behalf of the Defendants, filed two separate Affidavit Balasan (both affirmed on 17.07.2007) contesting the said applications of the Plaintiff to amend the Statement of Claim and the Order 26A application.
6. It is noteworthy that in the two Afidavit Balasan, the Defendants did raise the issue that the Plaintiff's action was statute-barred. We find identical averments in the said affidavits in the following terms:
"..... selanjutnya menegaskan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif sama sekali adalah terhalang oleh had masa memandangkan tuntutan Plaintiff adalah untuk tunggakan caruman daripada tempoh Julai 1999 sehingga Oktober 2000 di mana Plaintiff sepatutnya telah memfailkan tuntutan Plaintiff tersebut sebelum Julai 2005 akan tetapi Plaintif hanya menfailkan Saman dan Pernayataan Tuntutan Plaintif pada 12.07.2006 iaitu di luar masa yang diperuntukkan di bawah Undang-Undang ..."
7. From the Appeal Record, there does not appear to be any affidavit in response filed for the Plaintiff, further in the matter.
8. The Defendants' oral application to strike out the Summon and Statement of Claim adverted to above, was apparently made during the hearing of Kandungan 8 and Kandungan 10.
9. In the event both Kandungan 8 and Kandungan 10 of the Plaintiff were dismissed on the 23.04.2010.
On 12.05.2010 the Learned Judge proceeded to allow the oral application of the Defendants to strike out the Summons and Statement of Claim and it is against that decision to strike out that this appeal is being brought by the Plaintiff.
10. By the time this appeal came up for disposal the 1st. Defendant had been wound-up and the 2nd. Defendant had been adjudicated a bankrupt. The appeal was only being contested by the 3rd. Defendant.
Plaintiff's contention in summary
11. The Plaintiff's principal contention was that the terms "... notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or in any other written law ..." in section 46(1), and "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law ..." in the opening lines of section 65(1) of the EPF Act excluded or ousted as a whole the provisions of the LAct in respect of all proceedings brought by the Plaintiff to recover arrears of contribution. In other words, actions to recover such arrears against errant employers and their directors as empowered under the EPF Act (a unique statute for the benefit of employees as was argued) were not caught by the statute-bar of six years under the LAct for any such recovery action to be commenced.
12. Basically the Plaintiff cited three decisions of the courts in support of the argument above. It was contended that in Kekatong Sdn Bhd v. Bumiputra-Commercce Bank Berhad & Anor [2002] 7 CLJ 175; [2002] 6 MLJ 186, where there arose a conflict between two written law, it had been held that the provisions of a specific and subsequent legislation, there the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act 1998, prevailed over the operation of the general provisions of the LAct.
13. Counsel for the Plaintiff also referred to two recent decisions where a similar issue as to the effect of the highlighted terms in s. 46(1) and 65(1) as above, were considered. Hadariah JC in Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Lim Kek Bee & Anor - (unreported) had considered those provisions and also specifically the effect of the amendment made to s. 65(1) (by Act A914) by the insertion of the words/clause "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law ..." and had held that the intention of the legislature was to exclude applicability of other written law including the LAct in so far as proceedings brought under the EPF Act was concerned.
14. Similarly, Zabariah JC (as she then was) in Lembaga Kumpulan Simpanan Wang Pekerja v Manfred Smisek & 5 Ors [2009] 1 LNS 1719 had concluded that by those qualifying words in s. 46(1) and 65(1) of the EPF Act, the provisions of the LAct had been effectively excluded in the case of proceedings brought pursuant to the EPF Act.
15. The Plaintiff in reply-submissions also raised the issue that 'limitation' as a defence had not been expressly pleaded by the Defendants as required under section 4 of the LAct. This therefore, it was further argued, precluded the Defendants from pursuing with this line of defence to the Plaintiff's action, in any event.
Defendants' contention in summary
16. The Defendants' position was that the monies being sought to be recovered from the Defendants were in respect of alleged unremitted contributions in 1999 and the action filed in 2006 was clearly statute-barred pursuant to the provisions of the LAct. The applicability of the LAct to such recovery actions by the Plaintiff, it was contented, was not excluded at all by s. 46(1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act as presently worded.
The words "... notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or in any other written law ..." in section 46(1) and "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law ..." in the opening lines of section 65(1) of the EPF Act, it was pointed out by Counsel for the 3rd Defendant, was in the nature of what is recognized in law as 'non obstante' clause (see: Balakrishnan v. Ketua Pengarah Perhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor [1981] 1 LNS 64; [1981] 2 MLJ 259 at p 262 where the Federal Court observed: "... GO 44 ... opens with the significant non obstante clause 'Notwithstanding these General Orders ...' making it quite separate and distinct from the preceding three parts of the GO dealing with conduct, disciplinary procedure and general provisions pertaining to disciplinary punishments. GO 44 goes therefore beyond and is additional to what precedes it").
17. The effect of such a non obstante clause, it was argued, was not to exclude fully the whole of all other written law but only those provisions in other legislation or such part of other law which were in conflict, or which contradicted or clashed when the subject matter or intention or the scope behind the provision bearing the non-obstante which was to be established upon a further examination. Here, it was contended that the object behind s. 46 (1) and 65 (1) of the EPF Act did not involve or deal with the subject of "limitation period" as was stipulated in the LAct, at all.
18. It was also argued for the Defendants that should it have been the intention of the legislature to exclude the limitation period from applying to all recovery actions under the EPF Act, then the provisions should have mirrored the more specific words found in section 11P(d) of the National Service Act, 1952 which was in the following terms:
"Nothing in any other written law which prescribes for a period of limitation respecting the time for the hearing and determining of offences shall apply in the case of any proceedings so instituted as aforesaid."
19. It was further contented for the Defendants that for an exclusion of the LAct to be valid in law, section 3 of the LAct itself made it a requirement that the other written law in question should prescribe some other or alternative period of limitation. This, it was highlighted by Counsel, was glaringly absent in the case of the EPF Act in any event.
20. In response to the Plaintiff's contention that for 'limitation' to be pursued as a defence, it ought to be in the first place specifically pleaded, the Defendants' position was that this was not an absolute must as the highest courts in the country have allowed the defence of limitation to be still pursued, notwithstanding that it was not expressly pleaded, particularly, where the other party had notice that this was a defence that would be taken in the action.
Issues before the Court
21. In my assessment there were therefore two basic issues before the Court for determination in this appeal. They were:
(i) Whether the 'non obstante' clauses in s. 46(1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act had the effect of completely ousting the applicability of LAct, with the result that any recovery action commenced by the Plaintiff against an errant employer (incorporated company) and personally against the Directors of the entity, as was the case here, was not subject to any limitation period at all; and
(ii) Whether the Defendants in this case were absolutely precluded from raising the defence of 'limitation' since no such defence had been expressly pleaded in the Statement of Defence of the Defendants that had been filed in the action.
The approach when dealing with a non obstante clause
22. In the recent decision of the Federal Court in Perbadanan Kemajuan Kraftangan Malaysia v. DW Margaret David Wilson [2010] 5 CLJ 899, Heliliah Mohamed Yusoff FCJ noted that: "The term 'notwithstanding' means generally 'not to stand against' or 'in the way' or overriding" and went on to cite with approval a quote from the judgement of the Indian Supreme Court in Union of India v. I C Lala [1973] 2 SCC 72 at p. 77 which was as follows:
"The words notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure found at the beginning of s. 5A(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (now s. 17 Prevention of Corruption Act 1988) merely carve out a limited exemption from the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as they limit the class of persons who are competent to investigate offences mentioned in the section and to arrest without warrant. It does not mean that the whole of the Code of criminal procedure ... is made inapplicable."
(underlining mine for emphasis)
23. The approach to be taken in interpreting a provision containing an non obstante clause was more pointedly stated in yet another judgment of the Indian Supreme Court, that is in the case of A.G. Varadarajulu & Anor v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors AIR [1998] SC 1388 where at p. 1392 it declared:
"It is well settled that in dealing with a non obstante clause under which the legislature wants to give overriding effect to a section, the Court must try to find out the extent to which the legislature had intended to give one provision overriding effect over another provision. Such intention of the legislature in this behalf is to be gathered from the enacting part of the section. .... the non obstante clause is no doubt a very potent clause intended to exclude every consideration arising from the provisions of the same statute or other statute but for that reason alone we must determine the scope of the provision strictly. When the section containing the said clause does not refer to any particular provision which it intends to override but refers to the statute generally, it is not permissible to hold that it excludes the whole Act and stands alone all by itself. A search has, therefore, to be made with a view of determining which provision answers the description and which does not."
(Emphasis mine)
In that case, the issue of interpretation centered on whether one section excluded the application of another section in the same statute but to me the principle to be drawn was the same, namely, that where the non obstante clause refers generally without stating the specific provision or statute to be overridden, it is not permissible to exclude per se all other legislation or provisions in force in other legislations. It does not automatically displace or override all other legal provisions.
24. The extent of such intended exclusion must however be worked out from a further examination of the objective or scope or purpose behind the provisions where the non obstante clause is adopted. Only where then there arise a clash or a conflict between the specific statutory objective behind that provision and such other law on the same subject, would the other law be held to be excluded from being operative.
25. I therefore agree with submission of Counsel for the 3rd. Defendant that the Court should in the instant case, firstly, embark upon a further examination to determine the intention or objective behind s. 46(1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act. This was to ascertain whether the statutory intent or scope behind those two sections were in conflict with the limitation provisions of the LAct.
26. It is my conclusion therefore that in law the non obstante terms in s. 46 (1) and/or s. 65 (1) of the EPF Act, generally worded as they are without specific reference to any particular provision or legislation, does not go to exclude or oust the provisions of the LAct as a whole. Following from that there must then be a further examination undertaken by the court as to what was the specific legislative objective or the 'mischief intended to be cured by those sections in the EPF Act and whether in applying the law, a conflict or clash arose between that statutory objective and the law as found in those sections of the EPF Actand the other legislation or provisions on the same area of law.
Only if there was any such a conflict or clash between those provisions on the same subject, would the area in law covered by those sections in the EPF Act prevail to the exclusion of any conflicting other legal provision on that subject.
27. The attention of my sisters Hadariah JC and Zabariah JC in Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Lim Kek Bee & Anor and Lembaga Kumpulan Simpanan Wang Pekerja v. Manfred Smisek & 5 Ors respectively, appear not to have been drawn to the serious implication that surround the use of a non obstante clause in legislations and also to the proper approach to be adopted in interpreting the effect of such a clause as is found in s. 46 (1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act. With respect therefore, I have to disagree with the conclusions reached in those two decisions where it was held in a broad sweep, so to speak, that recovery actions by the Plaintiff under the EPF Act were not subject to or restricted by such limitation period as spelt out in the LAct.
Section 46 (1)
28.Section 46 (1) of the EPF Act reads as follows:
46. Joint and several liability of directors, etc
(1) Where any contributions remaining unpaid by a company, a firm or an association of persons, then, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or any other written law, the directors of such company during such period in which contributions were liable to be paid, or the partners of such firms, including any persons who were directors of such firms during such period in which contribution were liable to be paid, or the office-bearers of such association of persons, including any persons who were office-bearers of such association during such period in which contributions were liable to be paid, as the case may be, shall together with the company, firm or association of persons liable to pay the said contributions, be jointly and severally liable for the contribution due and payable to the Fund."
The language of s. 46(1), Counsel argued, clearly demonstrated that where, amongst others, an incorporated company with limited liability was the defaulting party the provision was intended 'to lift the corporate veil' and to impose personal liability on Directors of the company in default to settle the debts of the company.
Such a conclusion, it was contented further, was fortified by the marginal notes to that s. 46(1) in the following terms: 'Joint and several liability of directors etc.' It is settled law now that assistance in interpretation of statutory provisions may also be drawn from marginal notes to that section in the legislation itself: (Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. Sugumar Balakrishnan & Another Appeal [2002] 4 CLJ 105 (FC); Chai Siew Yin v. Leong Wee Shin [2004] 1 CLJ 752 (CA).)
29. I accept those submissions of Counsel for the 3rd Defendant and hold that it is clearly discernable from a reading of s. 46 of the EPF Act in its entirety that the legislative intent or purpose behind s. 46(1) was definitely to provide an additional right or recourse, jointly and severally, against directors or responsible individuals or officers of a defaulting company, partnership or association when, as the law ordinarily stood, there was no such right where the debtor was an incorporated company or the law was ambiguous in the case of partnerships and associations. (See also the decisions in Ong Kim Chuan & Anor v. Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja [2009] 6 CLJ 586 (CA) and Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Suasa Kristal (M) Bhd & Ors [2009] 8 CLJ 236). In effect therefore, an unequivocal statutory cause of action against directors or responsible individuals and officers of errant entities was being created by this provision, namely s. 46 (1) in the EPF Act.
30. Accordingly, what was being excluded by the non obstante clause in s. 46(1)- '... notwithstanding anything contrary in this Act or any other written law ...' - were only such specific provisions in the EPF Act itself or in other legislation that were not in accord with this statutory objective or scope underlying s. 46(1) namely to impose liability, inter alia, on directors of company to pay for the arrears of employees' contributions owed by a company.
Section 65(1)
31.Section 65 (1) of the EPF Act was as follows:
"65. Civil proceedings to recover contributions
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law all contributions payable under this Act may, without prejudice to any other remedy, be recoverable by the Board summarily as a civil debt."
Counsel for the 3rd Defendant in his submissions emphasized that this was an enabling provision to provide for a right to civil recovery simultaneously with criminal prosecution and, more importantly, to overcome any contention that the cause of action to recover defaulted contributions was only vested in the employees concerned and not the Plaintiff's Board. In other words, it was contended that the provision was intended to give locus standi to the Board of the Plaintiff to institute civil proceedings to recover dues -notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law.(See: Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Shaharuddin Omar & Ors [2008] 8 CLJ 684).
32. Accordingly, any provision in any other legislation that had the effect of denying the right of the Plaintiffs Board to bring civil proceedings independently in its name to recover arrears of contributions (including dividends and interest due on any contribution - s. 65(3)) as a civil debt was what was intended to be excluded and s. 65(1) would prevail in such event of conflict between this section and such provisions of the other written law.
33. Counsel for the Plaintiff however pointed out that the non obstante clause in s. 65(1) - 'Notwithstanding the provision of any other written law ...' - was not in the original legislation but was only later introduced as an amendment (Act A914) to the EPF Act (effective from 01.08.1995). It was her argument that the provision as it existed before the amendment was sufficient enough to provide the Board of the Plaintiff with the locus standi to pursue a civil debt and accordingly the amendments were in particular intended to oust the LAct since the Plaintiff was under the scheme of the EPF Act, the 'trustee of the Fund' (s. 25 EPF Act) and monies to be recovered as a civil debt were for the benefit of employees, the beneficiaries of the Fund.
I could not however see any nexus between those facts as they may be and how they expressly or impliedly could have displaced as claimed the statutory limitation period laid out in the LAct.
Could that have been the legislative intent behind the amendment to s. 65(1) of the EPF Act which introduced the non obstante terms to that section? Surely if that was the intention of the legislature behind the amendments, as argued, then it ought to have been laid down in more precise and express terms as we have in section 11P(d) of the National Service Act 1952:-
"Nothing in any other written law which prescribes for a period of limitation respecting the time for the hearing and determining of offences shall apply in the case of any proceedings so instituted as aforesaid".
Although in this National Service Act 1952 it referred to exclusion of limitation period in regard to criminal proceedings to be instituted, I do not see any reason why the same principles of statutory interpretation and exactitude should not have been adopted if that was the intent behind the use of the non obstante clauses not just in s. 65(1) but in both s. 45(1) and s. 65(1)of the EPF Act.
34. Similarly, as in the case of s. 45(1) of the EPF Act, the Court therefore in interpreting what was the extent of exclusion allowed by the non obstante terms in s. 65(1) - 'Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law'- had firstly to determine the statutory objective or purpose behind that section. In this respect, I agree with the submissions of Counsel for the 3rd. Defendant that the statutory intent of s. 65(1) was to enable the Board to have the locus standi to bring proceedings to recover unremitted contributions as a civil debt apart from the criminal proceedings envisaged in the EPF Act. What could therefore be effectively overridden or excluded by the use of the non obstante clause was only provisions in any other written law that conflicted or clashed with this statutory objective or scope of s. 65(1) of the EPF Act.
35. The question then before the Court was whether there was any conflict or clash between the statutory objective or purpose behind s. 45(1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act (or either of them) with the terms of the LAct, in particular the provisions therein setting the statutory deadlines for bringing actions in contract or tort, generally within six years of the cause of action arising. I could not find any such conflict or clash between such objective and the subject of time-bar or limitation found in the LAct. The statutory intent or scope of sections 45 and 65 of the EPF, as discussed above, were not at all or remotely even connected to the issue of limitation.
The non obstante clauses in those sections, that is, s. 45(1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act, were in wide and general terms and for the reasons discussed above did not in my assessment override or exclude the LAct as a whole or any specific limitation provision of that legislation.
36. For completeness I should also state that I also found merit in the submission of Counsel for the 3rd Defendant that s. 3 of the LAct required another period of limitation to be prescribed in whatever legislation that intended to displace or vary the statutory limitation period laid out in the LAct. Section 3 of the LAct reads:
"This Act does not apply to any action or arbitration for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other written law or to any action or arbitration ....".
As noted above no such alternative period of limitation was provided for in any event in the EPF Act.
37. Obviously, there are good policy reasons why an alternative limitation period should be prescribed in any legislation whose intention was to displace the provisions of the LAct, that is, either reducing or extending the time-bar for civil proceedings to be brought against a subject. For otherwise it would have meant that one is left open for his entire lifetime exposed to likely suits or proceedings in certain situations. The law only assist those who proceed without delay to enforce whatever rights and remedies they have and generally (subject to some exceptions) the period of six years from the time a cause of action arising has been fixed by statute to be a fair period obviously giving consideration to the burden on a likely defendant to preserve documents and secure relevant witnesses to resist any such potential action against him in the future.
38. I therefore hold that the Plaintiff had not been excluded or exempted from any of the provisions of the LAct by virtue of s. 45(1) and/or s. 65(1) of the EPF Act, as those provisions are presently worded and found in the statute book. The role of the court is to interpret and apply the law and not to create new law.
'Limitation' not pleaded as a defence
39. Counsel for the Plaintiff referred to s. 4 of the LAct and submitted that the Defendants should in any event be precluded from relying on the issue of 'limitation' to strike out the Summons and Statement of Claim as the defence of "limitation" was not in the first place specifically pleaded in the Statement of Defence filed by the Defendants in the action. Section 4 reads:
"4. Limitation not to operate as a bar unless specially pleaded.
Nothing in this Act shall operate as a bar to an action unless this Act has been expressly pleaded as a defence thereto in any case where under any written law relating to civil procedure for the time being in force such a defence is required to be so pleaded."
40. The rationale for the requirement that the defence of limitation must be expressly pleaded has been drilled into us from our 'procedure and pleadings' classes in law school. Whether limitation has set in or not is a question of fact (as opposed to law) and therefore it had to be specifically pleaded for the opposing party not to be taken by surprise by that issue in the conduct of their case.
41. Counsel for the Defendants on the other hand contended that this was not an absolute rule or one cast in stone. He relied on the Federal Court judgments in Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v. Lay Kee Tee & Ors [2009] 1 CLJ 663, and Hj Hussain Hj Ali & Ors v. Datuk Hj Mohamed Yaacob & Ors [1983] CLJ (Rep) 165; [1983] 2 CLJ 68 as support for the proposition that so long as the Plaintiff knew that the Defendants were going to raise the issue of 'limitation', there was no requirement that it should be expressly set in a statement of defence.
Counsel for the 3rd Defendant also drew attention to the fact that the Plaintiff had not raised any such objection at the Sessions Court stage when the Defendants' oral application to strike out was considered and the Plaintiff had only now in reply to Defendants' submissions against the appeal chosen to raise this issue pertaining to the absence of a specific defence of 'limitation' in the Statement of Defence.
42. The two Federal Court decisions cited by the 3rd Defendant's Counsel, no doubt were cases where no statements of defence had been filed and they were in the context of proceedings to strike out the actions under O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 before any defence was filed.
Would it then be any different that in this instant case a Statement of Defence had been filed but at an early stage of the proceedings itself (in the context of Plaintiff's applications for amendment including to the Statement of Claim), the Defendants had already given notice through their Afidavit Balasan that their defence would be that the action was not sustainable as it was statute-barred? I should not think so.
43. The Plaintiff had sufficient notice of this defence to be mounted by the Defendants to the action.
The same principles that can be extracted from the Federal Court decisions can be applied in the situation obtaining in this case, particularly if one is mindful that should the Plaintiff had been successful in amending their Statement of Claim, the Defendants would have had a corresponding right to amend their Statement of Defence. Nothing would have restricted the Defendants from then amending their pleadings to include a specific defence that the action was statute-barred. In short the so called defect in the pleading could and would have been cured in any case if the matter proceeded further.
44. Such an objection should have been taken by the Plaintiff in any case earlier in the proceedings and not just at this stage if the Plaintiff was indeed serious about the same. It however appears to me that the Plaintiff and the learned Sessions Judge acted or proceeded to deal with the Defendants' oral application to strike out the action (notwithstanding no express defence of limitation being pleaded), fully conscious of and recognising the Defendants' right always to amend their Statement of Defence to include the defence of 'limitation' if it came to that.
45. I am therefore constrained to reject the Plaintiff's contention that the failure by the Defendants to plead the defence of "limitation" in the Statement of Defence was fatal to the Defendants' case that the action was statute-barred and consequently the Defendants were also precluded from advancing their contention on the effect of non obstante clauses as found in s. 45 (1) and s. 65 (1) in the EPF Act in this appeal.
Conclusion
46. I am not therefore persuaded that the learned Sessions Judge had erred in law when he struck out the Plaintiff's Summons and Statement of Claim. Accordingly the Plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
The decision of the Sessions Court of 12.05.2010 is affirmed.
There will be no order as to cost.
Delivered on 31 JANUARY 2011
t.t
(VARGHESE A/L GEORGE VARUGHESE)
Judicial Commissioner
High Court of Malaya in Penang
HIGH COURT, PENANG
VARGHESE GEORGE VARUGHESE JC
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: 12A-403-2010]
31 JANUARY 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT PENANG
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: 12A-403-2010]
BETWEEN
LEMBAGA KUMPULAN WANG SIMPANAN PEKERJA
... Appellant
AND
1. CARIMONDE SDN BHD
... Respondents
2. SOO BENG CHENG
3. TEH BENG CHNEAH
GROUNDS OF DECISION
1. This was an appeal by the Appellant/Plaintiff (Plaintiff) against the Learned Session Judge's decision of 12.05.2010 striking out the Summon and Statement of Claim on the grounds that the Plaintiff's action was statute-barred. No 'Alasan Penghakiman' was available but it appears that the Sessions Judge was persuaded to do so on an oral application of the Respondents/Defendants (Defendants), on the grounds that the Plaintiff, regardless of sections 46 (1) and 65 (1) of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1991 (EPF Act), was not exempted from the statutory force of the Limitation Act 1953 (LAct).
Background
2. The Plaintiff commenced an action at the Session Court on 21.07.2006 to recover jointly and severally from the Defendants what is alleged to be unremitted contributions for the employees of the 1st Defendant for the period July 1999 to October 2000 (arrears), together with certain "dividends' and "interest" accruing upon the said sum in arrears. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants were the Directors of the 1st Defendant.
3. The Defendants had on 27.10.2006 filed a Statement of Defence to the said claim.
4. In May 2007 the Plaintiff proceeded to file an application pursuant to Order 26A of SCR 1980 for summary judgment to be entered against all the Defendants in the action. However before that application was dealt with, the Plaintiff filed applications to amend the Statement of Claim and also to amend the Order 26A application via Kandungan 8 (21.05.2007) and Kandungan 10 (31.05.2007), respectively.
5. In response to the Plaintiffs applications, the 3rd Defendant, on behalf of the Defendants, filed two separate Affidavit Balasan (both affirmed on 17.07.2007) contesting the said applications of the Plaintiff to amend the Statement of Claim and the Order 26A application.
6. It is noteworthy that in the two Afidavit Balasan, the Defendants did raise the issue that the Plaintiff's action was statute-barred. We find identical averments in the said affidavits in the following terms:
"..... selanjutnya menegaskan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif sama sekali adalah terhalang oleh had masa memandangkan tuntutan Plaintiff adalah untuk tunggakan caruman daripada tempoh Julai 1999 sehingga Oktober 2000 di mana Plaintiff sepatutnya telah memfailkan tuntutan Plaintiff tersebut sebelum Julai 2005 akan tetapi Plaintif hanya menfailkan Saman dan Pernayataan Tuntutan Plaintif pada 12.07.2006 iaitu di luar masa yang diperuntukkan di bawah Undang-Undang ..."
7. From the Appeal Record, there does not appear to be any affidavit in response filed for the Plaintiff, further in the matter.
8. The Defendants' oral application to strike out the Summon and Statement of Claim adverted to above, was apparently made during the hearing of Kandungan 8 and Kandungan 10.
9. In the event both Kandungan 8 and Kandungan 10 of the Plaintiff were dismissed on the 23.04.2010.
On 12.05.2010 the Learned Judge proceeded to allow the oral application of the Defendants to strike out the Summons and Statement of Claim and it is against that decision to strike out that this appeal is being brought by the Plaintiff.
10. By the time this appeal came up for disposal the 1st. Defendant had been wound-up and the 2nd. Defendant had been adjudicated a bankrupt. The appeal was only being contested by the 3rd. Defendant.
Plaintiff's contention in summary
11. The Plaintiff's principal contention was that the terms "... notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or in any other written law ..." in section 46(1), and "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law ..." in the opening lines of section 65(1) of the EPF Act excluded or ousted as a whole the provisions of the LAct in respect of all proceedings brought by the Plaintiff to recover arrears of contribution. In other words, actions to recover such arrears against errant employers and their directors as empowered under the EPF Act (a unique statute for the benefit of employees as was argued) were not caught by the statute-bar of six years under the LAct for any such recovery action to be commenced.
12. Basically the Plaintiff cited three decisions of the courts in support of the argument above. It was contended that in Kekatong Sdn Bhd v. Bumiputra-Commercce Bank Berhad & Anor [2002] 7 CLJ 175; [2002] 6 MLJ 186, where there arose a conflict between two written law, it had been held that the provisions of a specific and subsequent legislation, there the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act 1998, prevailed over the operation of the general provisions of the LAct.
13. Counsel for the Plaintiff also referred to two recent decisions where a similar issue as to the effect of the highlighted terms in s. 46(1) and 65(1) as above, were considered. Hadariah JC in Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Lim Kek Bee & Anor - (unreported) had considered those provisions and also specifically the effect of the amendment made to s. 65(1) (by Act A914) by the insertion of the words/clause "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law ..." and had held that the intention of the legislature was to exclude applicability of other written law including the LAct in so far as proceedings brought under the EPF Act was concerned.
14. Similarly, Zabariah JC (as she then was) in Lembaga Kumpulan Simpanan Wang Pekerja v Manfred Smisek & 5 Ors [2009] 1 LNS 1719 had concluded that by those qualifying words in s. 46(1) and 65(1) of the EPF Act, the provisions of the LAct had been effectively excluded in the case of proceedings brought pursuant to the EPF Act.
15. The Plaintiff in reply-submissions also raised the issue that 'limitation' as a defence had not been expressly pleaded by the Defendants as required under section 4 of the LAct. This therefore, it was further argued, precluded the Defendants from pursuing with this line of defence to the Plaintiff's action, in any event.
Defendants' contention in summary
16. The Defendants' position was that the monies being sought to be recovered from the Defendants were in respect of alleged unremitted contributions in 1999 and the action filed in 2006 was clearly statute-barred pursuant to the provisions of the LAct. The applicability of the LAct to such recovery actions by the Plaintiff, it was contented, was not excluded at all by s. 46(1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act as presently worded.
The words "... notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or in any other written law ..." in section 46(1) and "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law ..." in the opening lines of section 65(1) of the EPF Act, it was pointed out by Counsel for the 3rd Defendant, was in the nature of what is recognized in law as 'non obstante' clause (see: Balakrishnan v. Ketua Pengarah Perhidmatan Awam Malaysia & Anor [1981] 1 LNS 64; [1981] 2 MLJ 259 at p 262 where the Federal Court observed: "... GO 44 ... opens with the significant non obstante clause 'Notwithstanding these General Orders ...' making it quite separate and distinct from the preceding three parts of the GO dealing with conduct, disciplinary procedure and general provisions pertaining to disciplinary punishments. GO 44 goes therefore beyond and is additional to what precedes it").
17. The effect of such a non obstante clause, it was argued, was not to exclude fully the whole of all other written law but only those provisions in other legislation or such part of other law which were in conflict, or which contradicted or clashed when the subject matter or intention or the scope behind the provision bearing the non-obstante which was to be established upon a further examination. Here, it was contended that the object behind s. 46 (1) and 65 (1) of the EPF Act did not involve or deal with the subject of "limitation period" as was stipulated in the LAct, at all.
18. It was also argued for the Defendants that should it have been the intention of the legislature to exclude the limitation period from applying to all recovery actions under the EPF Act, then the provisions should have mirrored the more specific words found in section 11P(d) of the National Service Act, 1952 which was in the following terms:
"Nothing in any other written law which prescribes for a period of limitation respecting the time for the hearing and determining of offences shall apply in the case of any proceedings so instituted as aforesaid."
19. It was further contented for the Defendants that for an exclusion of the LAct to be valid in law, section 3 of the LAct itself made it a requirement that the other written law in question should prescribe some other or alternative period of limitation. This, it was highlighted by Counsel, was glaringly absent in the case of the EPF Act in any event.
20. In response to the Plaintiff's contention that for 'limitation' to be pursued as a defence, it ought to be in the first place specifically pleaded, the Defendants' position was that this was not an absolute must as the highest courts in the country have allowed the defence of limitation to be still pursued, notwithstanding that it was not expressly pleaded, particularly, where the other party had notice that this was a defence that would be taken in the action.
Issues before the Court
21. In my assessment there were therefore two basic issues before the Court for determination in this appeal. They were:
(i) Whether the 'non obstante' clauses in s. 46(1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act had the effect of completely ousting the applicability of LAct, with the result that any recovery action commenced by the Plaintiff against an errant employer (incorporated company) and personally against the Directors of the entity, as was the case here, was not subject to any limitation period at all; and
(ii) Whether the Defendants in this case were absolutely precluded from raising the defence of 'limitation' since no such defence had been expressly pleaded in the Statement of Defence of the Defendants that had been filed in the action.
The approach when dealing with a non obstante clause
22. In the recent decision of the Federal Court in Perbadanan Kemajuan Kraftangan Malaysia v. DW Margaret David Wilson [2010] 5 CLJ 899, Heliliah Mohamed Yusoff FCJ noted that: "The term 'notwithstanding' means generally 'not to stand against' or 'in the way' or overriding" and went on to cite with approval a quote from the judgement of the Indian Supreme Court in Union of India v. I C Lala [1973] 2 SCC 72 at p. 77 which was as follows:
"The words notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure found at the beginning of s. 5A(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (now s. 17 Prevention of Corruption Act 1988) merely carve out a limited exemption from the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as they limit the class of persons who are competent to investigate offences mentioned in the section and to arrest without warrant. It does not mean that the whole of the Code of criminal procedure ... is made inapplicable."
(underlining mine for emphasis)
23. The approach to be taken in interpreting a provision containing an non obstante clause was more pointedly stated in yet another judgment of the Indian Supreme Court, that is in the case of A.G. Varadarajulu & Anor v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors AIR [1998] SC 1388 where at p. 1392 it declared:
"It is well settled that in dealing with a non obstante clause under which the legislature wants to give overriding effect to a section, the Court must try to find out the extent to which the legislature had intended to give one provision overriding effect over another provision. Such intention of the legislature in this behalf is to be gathered from the enacting part of the section. .... the non obstante clause is no doubt a very potent clause intended to exclude every consideration arising from the provisions of the same statute or other statute but for that reason alone we must determine the scope of the provision strictly. When the section containing the said clause does not refer to any particular provision which it intends to override but refers to the statute generally, it is not permissible to hold that it excludes the whole Act and stands alone all by itself. A search has, therefore, to be made with a view of determining which provision answers the description and which does not."
(Emphasis mine)
In that case, the issue of interpretation centered on whether one section excluded the application of another section in the same statute but to me the principle to be drawn was the same, namely, that where the non obstante clause refers generally without stating the specific provision or statute to be overridden, it is not permissible to exclude per se all other legislation or provisions in force in other legislations. It does not automatically displace or override all other legal provisions.
24. The extent of such intended exclusion must however be worked out from a further examination of the objective or scope or purpose behind the provisions where the non obstante clause is adopted. Only where then there arise a clash or a conflict between the specific statutory objective behind that provision and such other law on the same subject, would the other law be held to be excluded from being operative.
25. I therefore agree with submission of Counsel for the 3rd. Defendant that the Court should in the instant case, firstly, embark upon a further examination to determine the intention or objective behind s. 46(1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act. This was to ascertain whether the statutory intent or scope behind those two sections were in conflict with the limitation provisions of the LAct.
26. It is my conclusion therefore that in law the non obstante terms in s. 46 (1) and/or s. 65 (1) of the EPF Act, generally worded as they are without specific reference to any particular provision or legislation, does not go to exclude or oust the provisions of the LAct as a whole. Following from that there must then be a further examination undertaken by the court as to what was the specific legislative objective or the 'mischief intended to be cured by those sections in the EPF Act and whether in applying the law, a conflict or clash arose between that statutory objective and the law as found in those sections of the EPF Actand the other legislation or provisions on the same area of law.
Only if there was any such a conflict or clash between those provisions on the same subject, would the area in law covered by those sections in the EPF Act prevail to the exclusion of any conflicting other legal provision on that subject.
27. The attention of my sisters Hadariah JC and Zabariah JC in Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Lim Kek Bee & Anor and Lembaga Kumpulan Simpanan Wang Pekerja v. Manfred Smisek & 5 Ors respectively, appear not to have been drawn to the serious implication that surround the use of a non obstante clause in legislations and also to the proper approach to be adopted in interpreting the effect of such a clause as is found in s. 46 (1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act. With respect therefore, I have to disagree with the conclusions reached in those two decisions where it was held in a broad sweep, so to speak, that recovery actions by the Plaintiff under the EPF Act were not subject to or restricted by such limitation period as spelt out in the LAct.
Section 46 (1)
28.Section 46 (1) of the EPF Act reads as follows:
46. Joint and several liability of directors, etc
(1) Where any contributions remaining unpaid by a company, a firm or an association of persons, then, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or any other written law, the directors of such company during such period in which contributions were liable to be paid, or the partners of such firms, including any persons who were directors of such firms during such period in which contribution were liable to be paid, or the office-bearers of such association of persons, including any persons who were office-bearers of such association during such period in which contributions were liable to be paid, as the case may be, shall together with the company, firm or association of persons liable to pay the said contributions, be jointly and severally liable for the contribution due and payable to the Fund."
The language of s. 46(1), Counsel argued, clearly demonstrated that where, amongst others, an incorporated company with limited liability was the defaulting party the provision was intended 'to lift the corporate veil' and to impose personal liability on Directors of the company in default to settle the debts of the company.
Such a conclusion, it was contented further, was fortified by the marginal notes to that s. 46(1) in the following terms: 'Joint and several liability of directors etc.' It is settled law now that assistance in interpretation of statutory provisions may also be drawn from marginal notes to that section in the legislation itself: (Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. Sugumar Balakrishnan & Another Appeal [2002] 4 CLJ 105 (FC); Chai Siew Yin v. Leong Wee Shin [2004] 1 CLJ 752 (CA).)
29. I accept those submissions of Counsel for the 3rd Defendant and hold that it is clearly discernable from a reading of s. 46 of the EPF Act in its entirety that the legislative intent or purpose behind s. 46(1) was definitely to provide an additional right or recourse, jointly and severally, against directors or responsible individuals or officers of a defaulting company, partnership or association when, as the law ordinarily stood, there was no such right where the debtor was an incorporated company or the law was ambiguous in the case of partnerships and associations. (See also the decisions in Ong Kim Chuan & Anor v. Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja [2009] 6 CLJ 586 (CA) and Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Suasa Kristal (M) Bhd & Ors [2009] 8 CLJ 236). In effect therefore, an unequivocal statutory cause of action against directors or responsible individuals and officers of errant entities was being created by this provision, namely s. 46 (1) in the EPF Act.
30. Accordingly, what was being excluded by the non obstante clause in s. 46(1)- '... notwithstanding anything contrary in this Act or any other written law ...' - were only such specific provisions in the EPF Act itself or in other legislation that were not in accord with this statutory objective or scope underlying s. 46(1) namely to impose liability, inter alia, on directors of company to pay for the arrears of employees' contributions owed by a company.
Section 65(1)
31.Section 65 (1) of the EPF Act was as follows:
"65. Civil proceedings to recover contributions
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law all contributions payable under this Act may, without prejudice to any other remedy, be recoverable by the Board summarily as a civil debt."
Counsel for the 3rd Defendant in his submissions emphasized that this was an enabling provision to provide for a right to civil recovery simultaneously with criminal prosecution and, more importantly, to overcome any contention that the cause of action to recover defaulted contributions was only vested in the employees concerned and not the Plaintiff's Board. In other words, it was contended that the provision was intended to give locus standi to the Board of the Plaintiff to institute civil proceedings to recover dues -notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law.(See: Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Shaharuddin Omar & Ors [2008] 8 CLJ 684).
32. Accordingly, any provision in any other legislation that had the effect of denying the right of the Plaintiffs Board to bring civil proceedings independently in its name to recover arrears of contributions (including dividends and interest due on any contribution - s. 65(3)) as a civil debt was what was intended to be excluded and s. 65(1) would prevail in such event of conflict between this section and such provisions of the other written law.
33. Counsel for the Plaintiff however pointed out that the non obstante clause in s. 65(1) - 'Notwithstanding the provision of any other written law ...' - was not in the original legislation but was only later introduced as an amendment (Act A914) to the EPF Act (effective from 01.08.1995). It was her argument that the provision as it existed before the amendment was sufficient enough to provide the Board of the Plaintiff with the locus standi to pursue a civil debt and accordingly the amendments were in particular intended to oust the LAct since the Plaintiff was under the scheme of the EPF Act, the 'trustee of the Fund' (s. 25 EPF Act) and monies to be recovered as a civil debt were for the benefit of employees, the beneficiaries of the Fund.
I could not however see any nexus between those facts as they may be and how they expressly or impliedly could have displaced as claimed the statutory limitation period laid out in the LAct.
Could that have been the legislative intent behind the amendment to s. 65(1) of the EPF Act which introduced the non obstante terms to that section? Surely if that was the intention of the legislature behind the amendments, as argued, then it ought to have been laid down in more precise and express terms as we have in section 11P(d) of the National Service Act 1952:-
"Nothing in any other written law which prescribes for a period of limitation respecting the time for the hearing and determining of offences shall apply in the case of any proceedings so instituted as aforesaid".
Although in this National Service Act 1952 it referred to exclusion of limitation period in regard to criminal proceedings to be instituted, I do not see any reason why the same principles of statutory interpretation and exactitude should not have been adopted if that was the intent behind the use of the non obstante clauses not just in s. 65(1) but in both s. 45(1) and s. 65(1)of the EPF Act.
34. Similarly, as in the case of s. 45(1) of the EPF Act, the Court therefore in interpreting what was the extent of exclusion allowed by the non obstante terms in s. 65(1) - 'Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law'- had firstly to determine the statutory objective or purpose behind that section. In this respect, I agree with the submissions of Counsel for the 3rd. Defendant that the statutory intent of s. 65(1) was to enable the Board to have the locus standi to bring proceedings to recover unremitted contributions as a civil debt apart from the criminal proceedings envisaged in the EPF Act. What could therefore be effectively overridden or excluded by the use of the non obstante clause was only provisions in any other written law that conflicted or clashed with this statutory objective or scope of s. 65(1) of the EPF Act.
35. The question then before the Court was whether there was any conflict or clash between the statutory objective or purpose behind s. 45(1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act (or either of them) with the terms of the LAct, in particular the provisions therein setting the statutory deadlines for bringing actions in contract or tort, generally within six years of the cause of action arising. I could not find any such conflict or clash between such objective and the subject of time-bar or limitation found in the LAct. The statutory intent or scope of sections 45 and 65 of the EPF, as discussed above, were not at all or remotely even connected to the issue of limitation.
The non obstante clauses in those sections, that is, s. 45(1) and s. 65(1) of the EPF Act, were in wide and general terms and for the reasons discussed above did not in my assessment override or exclude the LAct as a whole or any specific limitation provision of that legislation.
36. For completeness I should also state that I also found merit in the submission of Counsel for the 3rd Defendant that s. 3 of the LAct required another period of limitation to be prescribed in whatever legislation that intended to displace or vary the statutory limitation period laid out in the LAct. Section 3 of the LAct reads:
"This Act does not apply to any action or arbitration for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other written law or to any action or arbitration ....".
As noted above no such alternative period of limitation was provided for in any event in the EPF Act.
37. Obviously, there are good policy reasons why an alternative limitation period should be prescribed in any legislation whose intention was to displace the provisions of the LAct, that is, either reducing or extending the time-bar for civil proceedings to be brought against a subject. For otherwise it would have meant that one is left open for his entire lifetime exposed to likely suits or proceedings in certain situations. The law only assist those who proceed without delay to enforce whatever rights and remedies they have and generally (subject to some exceptions) the period of six years from the time a cause of action arising has been fixed by statute to be a fair period obviously giving consideration to the burden on a likely defendant to preserve documents and secure relevant witnesses to resist any such potential action against him in the future.
38. I therefore hold that the Plaintiff had not been excluded or exempted from any of the provisions of the LAct by virtue of s. 45(1) and/or s. 65(1) of the EPF Act, as those provisions are presently worded and found in the statute book. The role of the court is to interpret and apply the law and not to create new law.
'Limitation' not pleaded as a defence
39. Counsel for the Plaintiff referred to s. 4 of the LAct and submitted that the Defendants should in any event be precluded from relying on the issue of 'limitation' to strike out the Summons and Statement of Claim as the defence of "limitation" was not in the first place specifically pleaded in the Statement of Defence filed by the Defendants in the action. Section 4 reads:
"4. Limitation not to operate as a bar unless specially pleaded.
Nothing in this Act shall operate as a bar to an action unless this Act has been expressly pleaded as a defence thereto in any case where under any written law relating to civil procedure for the time being in force such a defence is required to be so pleaded."
40. The rationale for the requirement that the defence of limitation must be expressly pleaded has been drilled into us from our 'procedure and pleadings' classes in law school. Whether limitation has set in or not is a question of fact (as opposed to law) and therefore it had to be specifically pleaded for the opposing party not to be taken by surprise by that issue in the conduct of their case.
41. Counsel for the Defendants on the other hand contended that this was not an absolute rule or one cast in stone. He relied on the Federal Court judgments in Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v. Lay Kee Tee & Ors [2009] 1 CLJ 663, and Hj Hussain Hj Ali & Ors v. Datuk Hj Mohamed Yaacob & Ors [1983] CLJ (Rep) 165; [1983] 2 CLJ 68 as support for the proposition that so long as the Plaintiff knew that the Defendants were going to raise the issue of 'limitation', there was no requirement that it should be expressly set in a statement of defence.
Counsel for the 3rd Defendant also drew attention to the fact that the Plaintiff had not raised any such objection at the Sessions Court stage when the Defendants' oral application to strike out was considered and the Plaintiff had only now in reply to Defendants' submissions against the appeal chosen to raise this issue pertaining to the absence of a specific defence of 'limitation' in the Statement of Defence.
42. The two Federal Court decisions cited by the 3rd Defendant's Counsel, no doubt were cases where no statements of defence had been filed and they were in the context of proceedings to strike out the actions under O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 before any defence was filed.
Would it then be any different that in this instant case a Statement of Defence had been filed but at an early stage of the proceedings itself (in the context of Plaintiff's applications for amendment including to the Statement of Claim), the Defendants had already given notice through their Afidavit Balasan that their defence would be that the action was not sustainable as it was statute-barred? I should not think so.
43. The Plaintiff had sufficient notice of this defence to be mounted by the Defendants to the action.
The same principles that can be extracted from the Federal Court decisions can be applied in the situation obtaining in this case, particularly if one is mindful that should the Plaintiff had been successful in amending their Statement of Claim, the Defendants would have had a corresponding right to amend their Statement of Defence. Nothing would have restricted the Defendants from then amending their pleadings to include a specific defence that the action was statute-barred. In short the so called defect in the pleading could and would have been cured in any case if the matter proceeded further.
44. Such an objection should have been taken by the Plaintiff in any case earlier in the proceedings and not just at this stage if the Plaintiff was indeed serious about the same. It however appears to me that the Plaintiff and the learned Sessions Judge acted or proceeded to deal with the Defendants' oral application to strike out the action (notwithstanding no express defence of limitation being pleaded), fully conscious of and recognising the Defendants' right always to amend their Statement of Defence to include the defence of 'limitation' if it came to that.
45. I am therefore constrained to reject the Plaintiff's contention that the failure by the Defendants to plead the defence of "limitation" in the Statement of Defence was fatal to the Defendants' case that the action was statute-barred and consequently the Defendants were also precluded from advancing their contention on the effect of non obstante clauses as found in s. 45 (1) and s. 65 (1) in the EPF Act in this appeal.
Conclusion
46. I am not therefore persuaded that the learned Sessions Judge had erred in law when he struck out the Plaintiff's Summons and Statement of Claim. Accordingly the Plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
The decision of the Sessions Court of 12.05.2010 is affirmed.
There will be no order as to cost.
Delivered on 31 JANUARY 2011
t.t
(VARGHESE A/L GEORGE VARUGHESE)
Judicial Commissioner
High Court of Malaya in Penang
Saman Kerajaan Malaysia
KFH IJARAH HOUSE (M) SDN BHD v. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR
LAU BEE LAN J
[SUIT NO: S-21-186-2003]
3 NOVEMBER 2010
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Public servants - Authority - Authority of government servant to enter into contracts binding government - Assistant Curator of Muzium awarding contract without knowledge or approval of Jabatan Muzium - Whether contract binding upon Jabatan Muzium - Whether officer had express or ostensible authority to award contract - Whether exception to Turquand's case applied - Whether Jabatan Muzium had by conduct represented officer as having requisite authority - Whether Jabatan Muzium estopped from denying authority of officer
AGENCY: Agent - Public servants - Authority of government servant to enter into contracts binding government - Assistant Curator of Muzium awarding contract without knowledge or approval of Jabatan Muzium - Whether contract binding upon Jabatan Muzium - Whether officer had express or ostensible authority to award contract - Whether exception to Turquand's case applied - Whether Jabatan Muzium had by conduct represented officer as having requisite authority - Whether Jabatan Muzium estopped from denying authority of officer
Panji Alam Creative (M) Sdn Bhd ("Panji Alam") was awarded a contract by Jabatan Muzium Dan Antikuiti Malaysia ("Jabatan Muzium") to supply historical artifacts for Kompleks Kota Ngah Ibrahim or Kompleks Sejarah Matang and Muzium Perak ("Kompleks Kota Ngah Ibrahim") valued at RM1,212,650. Panji Alam applied to the plaintiff for an Al-Murabaha facility to finance the purchase of the historical artifacts and for this purpose, absolutely assigned the payment under the said contract to the plaintiff. By a letter dated 11 September 2000 Jabatan Muzium acknowledged and agreed to the assignment of the payment to the plaintiff and also of payment directly to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then purchased and paid for the historical artifacts which were delivered to Kompleks Kota Ngah Ibrahim. However, no payment was made to the plaintiff by the defendant and hence this claim by the plaintiff. The defendant claimed that it had no knowledge about the plaintiff and of the contract allegedly awarded to the plaintiff. It was argued that any purported award of contract was made by Encik Abdul Latib, the then Assistant Curator ("Latib") without any direction, knowledge, agreement and approval by the Jabatan Muzium and the Ministry of Finance Malaysia ("MOF") and that the former had acted in his own personal capacity in dealings with Panji Alam. According to the defendant, Latib had wrongfully used the defendant's letterhead without the consent, knowledge or permission of the defendant and he acted in his own capacity. Hence, the defendant contended that the contract was in contravention of the procedures in accordance to s. 2 of the Government Contracts Act 1949 ("the Act") and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to any claim for payment. The issues arising for determination were: (i) whether Latib had express and/or ostensible authority to award the contract to supply historical artifacts to Kompleks Kota Ngah Ibrahim; (ii) whether the defendant was bound by the letter of 11 September 2000 to effect payment for the historical artifacts to the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the defendant was in any event liable to pay to the plaintiff for the historical artifacts.
Held (allowing the plaintiff's claim):
(1) The exception to the Turquand's case did not apply in the factual matrix of this case. The fact that Latib was the Assistant Curator of Muzium Perak was confirmed. Latib and all other officers of the Muzium Department were a single composite known as the government; each of their act was an act of the government; the acts carried out by Latib was part of a chain of command and the decision made by the government through him was indicative of a devolution of power from a higher authority which was an integrated part of the system of government. (paras 11-11.4)
(2) Latib was provided with letterheads of Jabatan Muzium from the headquarters for him to issue letters for his daily duties as the highest ranking officer at Kompleks Kota Ngah Ibrahim. Latib dealt with members of the public as part of his daily duties. There was no limitation or restriction printed on the letterheads with regard to Latib's authority to issue or sign letters on behalf of Jabatan Muzium. (paras 11.3 & 11.4)
(3) Panji Alam and the plaintiff had honestly and reasonably believed in the existence of the authority to the extent apparent to Latib. In addition, the defendant as principal had held out Latib as their agent to have the authority to deal with the public including Panji Alam and the plaintiff on matters relating to Kompleks Kota Ngah Ibrahim. (para 11.6)
(4) Even if Latib did not have the authority to sign the disputed letters, the defendant had by their conduct represented or permitted to be represented to the plaintiff that Latib had the authority to act on the defendant's behalf and consequently the defendant was bound by Latib's acts to the same extent as if he had the authority. The defendant was now estopped from denying the authority of Latib. Latib had apparent or ostensible authority, if not actual authority, to enter into the contract with Panji Alam and also to acknowledge the assignment to pay the plaintiff. (para 11.8)
(5) The defendant through Jabatan Muzium had entered into the contract and were now trying to escape liability to invalidate the same on the ground that s. 2 of the Act was not followed. The court should be slow to declare the contract void and unenforceable; and "would not be astute to lend its aid" to enable the defendant to avoid liability under s. 2 of the Act having regard to the fact that Kompleks Kota Ngah Ibrahim had used the items supplied for ten years. (paras 14.2-15)
(6) The assignment of the debt from Panji Alam to the plaintiff was an absolute assignment. The defendant had on a balance of probabilities received the notice of assignment.
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
kata kata hikmah
14. Oleh itu, kita harus sentiasa mengingatkan diri kita, bahawa gaji kita dibayar dari kocek rakyat. Sekiranya kita merasakan tidak mampu memberikan perkhidmatan yang terbaik (mungkin, kerana merasa beban kerja terlalu berat, atau, gaji yang diterima dirasa tidak memadai), kita perlulah ingati, bahawa kita mempunyai pilihan, sama ada untuk terus memikul bebanan itu untuk kepentingan awam, ATAUPUN meninggalkan institusi itu untuk kepentingan diri sendiri.
Bila trio dato T nak didakwa?
59. For our adversarial system to be successful, all three parties, the judge, the prosecutor and the defence must play their respective roles in order to deliver justice. It does not start in Court. It starts with the law enforcement agencies. The law enforcement agencies collect the evidence. The prosecutor sieves through it and decides on the charge as well as the evidence and manner to be adduced in Court. The Defence will do its part to show otherwise. The Court balances the evidence adduced by both parties and applying the law decides who is right and who is wrong. No one single party can deliver justice without the support of the other. All of us, the three branches, must work together to make the three legged stool stand firmly on the ground, for otherwise the stool will topple over.
ini adalah ucapan Ketua Hakim Negara, yg pada posting ini dibuat aku tidak tahu keadaan sebenar kesihatan beliau.apapun aku ucapkan semoga terus sihat dan panjang umur.
merujuk kpd ucapan td dgn kes penyiaran video lucah oleh trio dato T, aku percaya polis dan pendakwaraya sudah terlalu lama membiarkan kes mudah ini tiada tindakan pendakwaan.negara ini semakin teruk dan kronik.moga semua ini akan berubah apabila pru13 melabuhkan tirainya.inshaallah.
ini adalah ucapan Ketua Hakim Negara, yg pada posting ini dibuat aku tidak tahu keadaan sebenar kesihatan beliau.apapun aku ucapkan semoga terus sihat dan panjang umur.
merujuk kpd ucapan td dgn kes penyiaran video lucah oleh trio dato T, aku percaya polis dan pendakwaraya sudah terlalu lama membiarkan kes mudah ini tiada tindakan pendakwaan.negara ini semakin teruk dan kronik.moga semua ini akan berubah apabila pru13 melabuhkan tirainya.inshaallah.
Monday, May 23, 2011
TAMPARULI (Sabah), 23 MAY, 2011: Consumers in Sabah can get free legal aid to bring their cases to the Consumer Claims Tribunal, Deputy Domestic Trade, Cooperatives and Consumerism Minister Datuk Tan Lian Hoe said.
He said the free legal aid program was made possible with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the ministry and the Sabah Law Association (SLA) and Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Sdn Bhd (Bank Rakyat).
"Under the program, SLA will provide legal aid to consumers at pro bono and the Bank Rakyat will pay to SLA for the court fees of not more than RM500 per case.
"The payment will be made from a fund set up by Bank Rakyat known as the 1Malaysia People's Fund," he said after the MoU signing here today.
Tan said today's event was a follow-up of the MoU signing between the Malaysian Bar Council and Bank Rakyat last March 8.
The program will be expanded to Sarawak soon, he added.
- Bernama
No party shall be represented by an advocate or solicitor during a hearing before the Tribunal and each party to a hearing shall conduct its own case at such hearing.
Apa khidmat nasihat yg akan diberi secara percuma ini? Mana pula datang wang rm500 sbg fee mahkamah. Tuntutan di Tribunal bukan di Mahkamah? Ni baru boleh petik kata2 leman yg tak lawak tu...tak paham betui aku
He said the free legal aid program was made possible with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the ministry and the Sabah Law Association (SLA) and Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Sdn Bhd (Bank Rakyat).
"Under the program, SLA will provide legal aid to consumers at pro bono and the Bank Rakyat will pay to SLA for the court fees of not more than RM500 per case.
"The payment will be made from a fund set up by Bank Rakyat known as the 1Malaysia People's Fund," he said after the MoU signing here today.
Tan said today's event was a follow-up of the MoU signing between the Malaysian Bar Council and Bank Rakyat last March 8.
The program will be expanded to Sarawak soon, he added.
- Bernama
No party shall be represented by an advocate or solicitor during a hearing before the Tribunal and each party to a hearing shall conduct its own case at such hearing.
Apa khidmat nasihat yg akan diberi secara percuma ini? Mana pula datang wang rm500 sbg fee mahkamah. Tuntutan di Tribunal bukan di Mahkamah? Ni baru boleh petik kata2 leman yg tak lawak tu...tak paham betui aku
Sunday, May 22, 2011
Tragedi Tanah Runtuh
Takziah kpd mangsa2 kejadian tanah runtuh di Hulu Langat.Moga roh2 mereka dicucuri rahmat Allah dan ditempatkan di kalangan orng2 beriman dan beramal soleh.
Pendaftar Pertubuhan Mahu Batalkan PKR
SOCIETIES ACT 1966 (REVISED 1987)
ACT 335
Remove Highlights
PART I
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO SOCIETIES GENERALLY
13. Cancellation and suspension.
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Registrar may, in the following cases, cancel the registration of any society registered under section 7-
[Am. P.U. (A) 282/70; Act A102; A515; A557]
(a) upon its dissolution by the society to be verified in such manner as the Registrar may require or upon dissolution by the Registrar in accordance with this Act;
(b) on the order made by the Minister under section 5;
(c) if the Registrar is satisfied-
(i) that the registration was effected as the result of a fraud or a mistake or misrepresentation in any material particular;
(ii) that the society is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to or incompatible with peace, welfare, good order or morality in Malaysia;
(iii) that the society is pursuing objects other than the objects with which the society is registered;
(iv) that the society has wilfully contravened any provision of this Act or of any regulation made thereunder or of any of its rules or that any members of the society have habitually contravened the provision of section 4(1) of the Sedition Act 1948 by any acts or utterances to which section 3(1)(f) of that Act applies;
(v) that the society has ceased to exist;
[Am. Act A1027]
(vi) that the society has failed to comply with an order made by him under section 13A;
[Am. Act A1027]
(vii) that the society has failed to comply with the provisions of section 2A;
[Am. Act A1027]
(viii) that the society has contravened the provisions of section 52; or
[Am. Act A1027]
(ix) that the society has failed to comply with the notice served by him under subsection (1) of section 16; and
[Ins. Act A1027]
(d) upon the society becoming unlawful under section 14(7) for failure to furnish written information.
(2) Where the Registrar proposes to cancel the registration of any registered society under paragraph (c) of subsection (1) the Registrar-
(a) shall notify one or more of the office-bearers of the society of his intention to cancel the registration of the society; and
(b) shall give him or them an opportunity to submit reasons in writing within thirty days from the date of the notification why the registration should not be cancelled.
[Subs. Act A1027]
(2A) The Registrar may, during the period specified in paragraph (b) of subsection (2), by order in writing suspend all or any of the activities of the registered society-
(a) where he thinks it necessary to do so-
(i) in the public interest; or
(ii) in the interest of the registered society; or
(b) in order to restrain the registered society from further infringing or violating any provision of this Act, any regulation made thereunder or any rule of the society.
[Ins. Act A1027]
(2B) An order made under subsection (2A)-
(a) may contain such conditions as the Registrar deems necessary or expedient; and
(b) shall continue in force until the order is revoked or the registration of the society is cancelled.
[Ins. Act A1027]
(2C) An office-bearer or any person managing or assisting in the management of a society who fails to comply with an order made under subsection (2A) shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit, and where the offence is a continuing one, shall, in addition, be liable to a daily fine not exceeding five hundred ringgit for each day after the first day during which the offence continues.
[Ins. Act A1027]
(3) Where the Registrar cancels the registration of a registered society under this section or under any other provision of this Act, the provisions of section 17 shall apply to that registered society and such cancellation shall be published in the Gazette.
ACT 335
Remove Highlights
PART I
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO SOCIETIES GENERALLY
13. Cancellation and suspension.
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Registrar may, in the following cases, cancel the registration of any society registered under section 7-
[Am. P.U. (A) 282/70; Act A102; A515; A557]
(a) upon its dissolution by the society to be verified in such manner as the Registrar may require or upon dissolution by the Registrar in accordance with this Act;
(b) on the order made by the Minister under section 5;
(c) if the Registrar is satisfied-
(i) that the registration was effected as the result of a fraud or a mistake or misrepresentation in any material particular;
(ii) that the society is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to or incompatible with peace, welfare, good order or morality in Malaysia;
(iii) that the society is pursuing objects other than the objects with which the society is registered;
(iv) that the society has wilfully contravened any provision of this Act or of any regulation made thereunder or of any of its rules or that any members of the society have habitually contravened the provision of section 4(1) of the Sedition Act 1948 by any acts or utterances to which section 3(1)(f) of that Act applies;
(v) that the society has ceased to exist;
[Am. Act A1027]
(vi) that the society has failed to comply with an order made by him under section 13A;
[Am. Act A1027]
(vii) that the society has failed to comply with the provisions of section 2A;
[Am. Act A1027]
(viii) that the society has contravened the provisions of section 52; or
[Am. Act A1027]
(ix) that the society has failed to comply with the notice served by him under subsection (1) of section 16; and
[Ins. Act A1027]
(d) upon the society becoming unlawful under section 14(7) for failure to furnish written information.
(2) Where the Registrar proposes to cancel the registration of any registered society under paragraph (c) of subsection (1) the Registrar-
(a) shall notify one or more of the office-bearers of the society of his intention to cancel the registration of the society; and
(b) shall give him or them an opportunity to submit reasons in writing within thirty days from the date of the notification why the registration should not be cancelled.
[Subs. Act A1027]
(2A) The Registrar may, during the period specified in paragraph (b) of subsection (2), by order in writing suspend all or any of the activities of the registered society-
(a) where he thinks it necessary to do so-
(i) in the public interest; or
(ii) in the interest of the registered society; or
(b) in order to restrain the registered society from further infringing or violating any provision of this Act, any regulation made thereunder or any rule of the society.
[Ins. Act A1027]
(2B) An order made under subsection (2A)-
(a) may contain such conditions as the Registrar deems necessary or expedient; and
(b) shall continue in force until the order is revoked or the registration of the society is cancelled.
[Ins. Act A1027]
(2C) An office-bearer or any person managing or assisting in the management of a society who fails to comply with an order made under subsection (2A) shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit, and where the offence is a continuing one, shall, in addition, be liable to a daily fine not exceeding five hundred ringgit for each day after the first day during which the offence continues.
[Ins. Act A1027]
(3) Where the Registrar cancels the registration of a registered society under this section or under any other provision of this Act, the provisions of section 17 shall apply to that registered society and such cancellation shall be published in the Gazette.
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Penghakiman Bijaksana
"In my view the prosecution could be ruled to have made out a prima facie case against the accused when the probative value of the evidence on all the essential elements in the charge taken as a whole is such that, if unrebutted, it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts pertaining to such essential elements or to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts existed or did happen. It is therefore wrong for a judge or magistrate to require the prosecution to prove that the accused is actually guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before calling for his defence. That requirement for ultimate decision must be postponed until the end of the trial, and to reiterate there is no duty cast on the prosecution to actually prove their case beyond reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused at the close of the case for the prosecution."
Keputusan kes pendakwaan terhadap Dato Sri Anwar Ibrahim yang diumumkan Hakim pada 16 Mei 2011 yg lalu dipergunakan sepenuhnya oleh media khususnya media pro umno bn untuk menunjukkan Anwar bersalah walaupun belum dibuktikan bersalah. Malahan Hakim sendiri memberi alasan penghakiman yang janggal apabila membuat keputusan seolah-olah perbicaraan telah sampai peringkat akhir sedangkan ini baru peringkat prima facie.
Penghakiman yg dipetik di atas adalah penghakiman bijaksana Yang Amat Arif Hakim yg lain yg sepatutnya menjadi panduan kpd Hakim Zabidin dlm membuat penghakiman dan alasan penghakiman.
Malahan perkataan beyond reasonable doubt digunapakai pd peringkat ini bg menggambarkan Anwar bersalah walaupun pembelaan belum didengar.Inilah konspirasi politik jahat untuk menjatuhkan Anwar dan menanam semangat reformasi ke liang lahad.Walau apapun konspirasi jahat, fitnah keji dan ugutan melampau, kami tetap menyokong reformasi dan perubahan di Malaysia. Ayuh kita tumbangkan BN pd PRU13!!
Keputusan kes pendakwaan terhadap Dato Sri Anwar Ibrahim yang diumumkan Hakim pada 16 Mei 2011 yg lalu dipergunakan sepenuhnya oleh media khususnya media pro umno bn untuk menunjukkan Anwar bersalah walaupun belum dibuktikan bersalah. Malahan Hakim sendiri memberi alasan penghakiman yang janggal apabila membuat keputusan seolah-olah perbicaraan telah sampai peringkat akhir sedangkan ini baru peringkat prima facie.
Penghakiman yg dipetik di atas adalah penghakiman bijaksana Yang Amat Arif Hakim yg lain yg sepatutnya menjadi panduan kpd Hakim Zabidin dlm membuat penghakiman dan alasan penghakiman.
Malahan perkataan beyond reasonable doubt digunapakai pd peringkat ini bg menggambarkan Anwar bersalah walaupun pembelaan belum didengar.Inilah konspirasi politik jahat untuk menjatuhkan Anwar dan menanam semangat reformasi ke liang lahad.Walau apapun konspirasi jahat, fitnah keji dan ugutan melampau, kami tetap menyokong reformasi dan perubahan di Malaysia. Ayuh kita tumbangkan BN pd PRU13!!
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
Home Ministry denies granting citizenship for election purposes
Home Ministry denies granting citizenship for election purposes
Mana menteri umno?knp menteri tak jwb?
Mana menteri umno?knp menteri tak jwb?
Monday, May 9, 2011
Gula Kaya
Malayan Sugar Manufacturing (MSM),Prai, Pulau Pinang
Central Sugar Refinery (CSR), Shah Alam, Selangor
Gula Padang Terap (GPT), Padang Terap, Kedah
Kilang Gula Felda Perlis (KGFP), Chuping, Perlis.
Inilah empat pengeluar utama gula di Malaysia.Aku tak pasti ada pengeluar lain selain empat ini. Maka dengan kenaikan harga gula ini maka makin kaya la pengeluar gula kerana aku tidak pula dengar kenaikan ini kerana menampung peningkatan kos pengeluaran.
Sebagai sebuah negara yg sukakan manis, industri gula ini amat menguntungkan di Malaysia.Adakah kita akan terus membeli kuih muih yang manis-manis, minum air manis? atau kita kena ubah gaya hidup seperti kempen kerajaan be end.Kali ini, kita benar-benar berubah.daripada gaya hidup kepada gaya mengundi.kita ubah cara hidup sihat dan sederhana serta kita ubah juga cara hidup pemimpin mewah dengan cara membuang mereka pada PRU13 nanti.Ingat ubah gaya hidup kita dan ubah gaya hidup pemimpin mewah supaya mereka hilang kuasa dan kembali sedar bahawa rakyatlah yang memegang kuasa sebenarnya.
Central Sugar Refinery (CSR), Shah Alam, Selangor
Gula Padang Terap (GPT), Padang Terap, Kedah
Kilang Gula Felda Perlis (KGFP), Chuping, Perlis.
Inilah empat pengeluar utama gula di Malaysia.Aku tak pasti ada pengeluar lain selain empat ini. Maka dengan kenaikan harga gula ini maka makin kaya la pengeluar gula kerana aku tidak pula dengar kenaikan ini kerana menampung peningkatan kos pengeluaran.
Sebagai sebuah negara yg sukakan manis, industri gula ini amat menguntungkan di Malaysia.Adakah kita akan terus membeli kuih muih yang manis-manis, minum air manis? atau kita kena ubah gaya hidup seperti kempen kerajaan be end.Kali ini, kita benar-benar berubah.daripada gaya hidup kepada gaya mengundi.kita ubah cara hidup sihat dan sederhana serta kita ubah juga cara hidup pemimpin mewah dengan cara membuang mereka pada PRU13 nanti.Ingat ubah gaya hidup kita dan ubah gaya hidup pemimpin mewah supaya mereka hilang kuasa dan kembali sedar bahawa rakyatlah yang memegang kuasa sebenarnya.
Friday, May 6, 2011
Fairly legal
Pusat senaman Yoga kalah tuntutan kes saman dan diarah bayar kos RM6,000.00 kepada Defendan.Mahkamah Majistret hari ini memutuskan menolak tuntutan Plaintif terhadap seorang individu yang dikatakan gagal membayar yuran keahlian kelab yoga tersebut.Defendan yang mendakwa bahawa dia ditawarkan tempoh percubaan oleh kelab tersebut tetapi sebaliknya dipaksa membayar yuran langganan setahun walaupun tidak menggunakan perkhidmatan kelab tsebut.
Defendan yang diwakli oleh peguam terkemuka di UKM bersyukur kerana Mahkamah memberi penghakiman menolak tuntutan Plaintif tersebut dengan menghantar sms love u &the court kpd peguam terbabit.
Defendan yang diwakli oleh peguam terkemuka di UKM bersyukur kerana Mahkamah memberi penghakiman menolak tuntutan Plaintif tersebut dengan menghantar sms love u &the court kpd peguam terbabit.
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Fairy legal
Fairly legal is one of my favorite television show...everything seems so easy in that series...in reality there is no fairly legal but fairy legal and fail legal...the system has let us down so fucking bad that the murderer are still at large..the corruptor still walk free...the child rapist still fucking around etc etc....
Ini tulisan sempena hari amarah semalaysia
Ini tulisan sempena hari amarah semalaysia
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
sarah
hari ni nak jumpa teacher sarah and discuss about sarah's development.dah banyak improvement sarah lalui.thanks to the school dan lain2 terapi yg sarah ambik.
Editorial | Chhan: 5 Man United-Barca thoughts | ESPNSTAR.com
Could this year's Champions League final be Sir Alex Ferguson's last game in charge of Manchester United? It's a closely guarded secret when the great man will retire but it would be some way to say goodbye if United do the double. A record 19th league title and the beating of Barcelona - who are the team of the moment - would surely seal his place as one of the greatest managers of all time?
fromChhan: 5 Man United-Barca thoughts | ESPNSTAR.com
fromChhan: 5 Man United-Barca thoughts | ESPNSTAR.com
APLIKASI SISTEM TENDER DI SARAWAK BAGI KES-KES JUALAN TANAH SECARA BERCAGAR ATAU CAJ (CHARGED LAND): SATU KAJIAN
APLIKASI SISTEM TENDER DI SARAWAK BAGI KES-KES JUALAN TANAH SECARA BERCAGAR ATAU CAJ (CHARGED LAND): SATU KAJIAN
by
MUSYIRI PEET
[2011] 1 LNS(A) xxv
MALAYSIA
1. Pengenalan-latar belakang
Apabila memperkatakan tentang sistem perundangan di negeri Sarawak, khususnya perihal tanah, kedudukannya agak berlainan dan tersendiri berbanding negeri-negeri lain. Parlimen melalui Perkara 95D dan 95E Perlembagaan Persekutuan telah memberi kelonggaran kepada kedua-dua negeri ini untuk tidak terikat dengan polisi yang ditetapkan oleh Majlis Tanah Kebangsaan di peringkat Persekutuan. Oleh yang demikian, di dalam kajian ini, undang-undang yang terpakai adalah Kanun Tanah Sarawak (Bab 81) (selepas daripada ini dirujuk sebagai "Kanun Tanah"). Setakat perlu, perbandingan akan dibuat dengan Kanun Tanah Negara. Walau bagaimanapun, rujukan kepada Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (selepas daripada ini dirujuk sebagai "KMT 1980"), adalah sesuatu yang mustahak kerana kebanyakan kes-kes jualan tanah secara bercagar (charge land) adalah di bawah bidangkuasa Mahkamah Tinggi.
Di dalam kajian ini juga, akan dihuraikan lebih lanjut tentang prosedur sistem tender, kelebihan dan kekurangan jika dibandingkan dengan lelongan awam, isu-isu yang timbul, rujukan nas undang-undang dan di mana perlu dilampirkan statistik kes-kes yang mengaplikasikan sistem tender di Sarawak.
2. Prosedur Bagi Sistem Tender
i. Sebelum Perintah Jualan
Secara ringkas, prosedur sebelum mendapatkan perintah jualan adalah seperti berikut. Apabila berlakunya kemungkiran atau kegagalan defendan atau defendan-defendan untuk membuat bayaran prinsipal sepertimana yang dipersetujui di dalam gadaian, maka pihak Plaintiff akan menyerahkan satu bentuk notis yang dikenali sebagai notis statutori sepertimana yang dikehendaki di dalam Seksyen 148(1) Kanun Tanah kepada defendan atau penggadai (chargee)[1] selaras dengan terma gadaian itu selain daripada notis tuntutan daripada peguam. Sekiranya pihak Defendan masih enggan menjelaskan tunggakan tersebut, pihak Plaintiff atau pemegang gadaian (chargor) akan memfailkan tuntutan di Mahkamah Tinggi untuk mendapatkan relif-relif yang berpatutan termasuk perintah jualan terhadap tanah tersebut[2]. Satu saman pemula akan difailkan selaras dengan Aturan 83 Kaedah 1(1)(b) dan (3) KMT 1980. Dengan andaian semua suratcara adalah teratur, satu perintah jualan akan diperolehi daripada Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. Perintah jualan ini berlandaskan kepada peruntukan seksyen 150(1) Kanun Tanah yang berbunyi seperti berikut;
...The sale shall be by public auction or tender or such other mode of sale as may be directed by the court subject to such conditions of sale as shall be approved by the court. The court shall also fix the date of the sale, which shall be not less than 30 days from the date of the order of sale, and shall authorize such other acts as may be necessary for the conduct of sale. A reserve price shall be put on the land which shall be approximately equal to its estimated fair market value.
Klausa undang-undang inilah yang menzahirkan sistem tender di Sarawak yang dipercayai tidak terdapat di dalam peruntukan Kanun Tanah Negara. Kanun Tanah Negara hanya memperuntukkan jualan secara lelongan awam sepertimana yang dinyatakan di dalam seksyen 257(1)(a) KTN. Sebaliknya, seksyen 150(1) Kanun Tanah sebenarnya memberikan option sama ada memohon jualan secara lelongan awam atau menggunakan tender. Dari segi sejarah, sebelum 1994, seksyen 150 hanya memperuntukkan lelongan secara awam sahaja tetapi melalui Ordinan Kanun Tanah (Pindaan) 1994 (Am. Cap. A17)[3] yang digazetkan pada 23.6.1994 telah memasukkan frasa tersebut, iaitu "or tender or such other mode of sale as may be directed by the court".
ii. Selepas Perintah Jualan
Selanjutnya, selepas Perintah Jualan diperoleh, sepertimana lazim, peguam Plaintiff akan memfailkan Saman Minta Arahan (SFD) selaras dengan Kaedah 25 KMT 1980 dan tarikh pendengaran akan ditetapkan. Pada tarikh tersebut, sekiranya permohonan SFD dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah[4], maka pihak mahkamah akan menetapkan tarikh untuk penerimaan tender dan penutupan tender. Lazimnya dalam sebulan setengah ke dua bulan daripada tarikh perintah. Tempoh tender pula adalah selama 2 minggu atau 17 hari (jika mengambil kira hari Sabtu dan Ahad). Contoh seperti berikut, perintah SFD diberikan pada 1.1.2011. Tender akan diterima mulai 7.3.2011, hari Isnin, pukul 8.30 pagi sehingga tender ditutup pada hari Rabu, 3.30 petang, 23.3.2011. Tender kemudian akan dibuka pada 24.3.2011, hari Khamis, jam 10.00 pagi.
Sebelum tiba tarikh penerimaan tender, tugas pelelong yang dilantik oleh mahkamah adalah sama sebagaimana di dalam lelongan awam, yakni termasuk menyediakan laporan penilaian bagi menentukan kadar yang munasabah untuk harga pasaran hartanah tersebut. Selain itu, notis jualan dan proclamation of sale juga perlu diiklankan dan ditampal di Papan Kenyataan Mahkamah untuk memaklumkan kepada orang ramai yang berminat untuk membeli hartanah itu.
Bakal pembeli yang berminat hendaklah menyediakan bank draft yang bernilai sekurang-kurangnya 10% daripada nilai harga pasaran tersebut. Bank draft tersebut akan dimasukkan di dalam sampul surat termetri dan dialamatkan kepada Timbalan Pendaftar atau Penolong Kanan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi yang mana berkenaan. Apabila tempoh tender mula dibuka, sampul surat tersebut akan dimasukkan di dalam kotak peti berkunci yang tersedia di pejabat pendaftaran atau bilik lelong Mahkamah yang berkenaan. Kunci tersebut mempunyai tiga anak kunci yang mana hanya boleh dibuka sekiranya kesemua kunci itu digunakan serentak. Kunci tersebut dipegang oleh tiga pihak yang berlainan, iaitu peguam Plaintiff, pelelong yang dilantik dan bailif mahkamah. Pada hari pembukaan tender, bakal pembeli yang meletakkan nilaian bank draft tertinggi akan diisytiharkan oleh pelelong sebagai berjaya memenangi tender tersebut dan dikehendaki menjelaskan baki bayaran di dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan. Setiap proses ini akan diawasi oleh pegawai Mahkamah sama ada Timbalan Pendaftar atau Pendaftar Mahkamah Rendah yang berkenaan.
3. Kelebihan sistem tender
Kelebihan yang paling ketara di dalam sistem tender adalah tahap ketelusan bakal pembeli atau pembida. Di dalam sistem lelongan awam, peluang untuk manipulasi terbuka luas kerana kewujudan sesetengah sindiket yang cuba menganggu pembeli atau pembida bona-fide. Pihak-pihak ini akan bertindak sebagai "pemain atau player" dengan menjadi pembida untuk hartanah yang sama yang menjadi tumpuan dan cuba mempengaruhi pembida yang suci hati untuk tidak membida semasa proses lelongan awam tersebut walaupun telah mendepositkan wang pertaruhan. Natijahnya, pembida yang suci hati akan terganggu dan hartanah tersebut sukar untuk dijual mengikut kehendak kuasa pasaran yang sewajarnya.
Tetapi sebaliknya di dalam sistem tender, proses penjualan hartanah tersebut berjalan lancar kerana ketelusan sistemnya. Hartanah tersebut dapat terjual sepertimana kehendak kuasa pasaran. Mana-mana pihak tidak mengetahui siapa bakal pembeli yang layak atau memenangi tender tersebut sehingga kesemua sampul surat tersebut dibuka serentak pada hari pembukaan tender. Malah semasa pembukaan sampul surat tersebut, ianya akan disaksikan oleh kesemua pihak, sama ada bakal pembeli, peguam Plaintiff, pelelong dan pegawai serta bailif mahkamah. Tidak timbul soal sindiket dalam hal ini.
Malah menyedari peri pentingnya sistem tender ini, Hakim Besar Sabah dan Sarawak, YAA Tan Sri Datuk Sri Panglima Rirchard Malanjum telah mengarahkan agar semua jualan tanah di Sarawak dibuat secara tender dan tidak lagi melalui lelongan awam[5].
4. Isu-Isu Yang Timbul
i. Adakah perintah jualan di dalam sistem tender boleh diketepikan?
Di dalam sistem lelongan awam, terdapat peruntukan untuk mengenepikan perintah jualan, yakni di bawah seksyen 256(3) KTN yang berbunyi seperti berikut;
On any such application, the Court shall order the sale of the land or lease to which the charge relates unless it is satisfied of the existence of cause to the contrary (penekanan ditambah).
Tafsiran lebih lanjut tentang "cause to the contrary" telah dinyatakan di dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan, Suresh Emmanuel Abishegam & Anor v. RHB Bank Berhad [2010] 4 CLJ 685. Kes ini telah memperincikan apakah ujian atau standard yang perlu dipenuhi bagi maksud mencapai "cause to the contrary" tersebut. Yang Arif Kang Hwee Gee JCA (pada waktu itu) setelah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Agung di dalam Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 2 CLJ 36, menyatakan;
(i) where the chargor is able to successfully impeach the chargee's title to the charge to any of the grounds provided in s. 340 of the Code;
(ii) where there is a failure on the part of the chargee to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale;
(iii) where to grant an order for sale would contravene some rule of law or equity.
Sungguhpun demikian, apakah kedudukannya di dalam Kanun Tanah di Sarawak? Hal ini kerana peruntukan "cause to the contrary" sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di dalam seksyen 256(3) KTN tidak dinyatakan di sini. Di dalam hal ini, rujukan keputusan nas undang-undang adalah perlu. Di dalam kes di Mahkamah Tinggi Miri, Sarawak, yakni kes United Malayan Banking Corporation v. Hassim Hj Ladis & Ors, [2001] 8 CLJ 775, peguam Plaintiff telah membawa perhatian mahkamah untuk merujuk kepada peruntukan Seksyen 256 KTN sama ada adakah adil untuk membenarkan perintah jualan atau wujudnya "cause to the contrary". Peguam Plaintiff berhujah bahawa prinsip ini harus digunapakai di dalam permohonan di bawah seksyen 148(2)(c) Kanun Tanah. YA Sulaiman Daud JC (pada waktu itu) memutuskan bersetuju dengan pendapat peguam Plaintiff bahawa prinsip yang sama harus terpakai bagi peruntukan ini ketika mendengar permohonan untuk perintah jualan.
Oleh itu, berlandaskan kepada nas-nas undang-undang tersebut, maka isu tersebut dijawab secara afirmatif.
ii. Adakah Defendan perlu dimaklumkan sekali lagi di dalam tender yang kedua sekiranya tender yang pertama tidak berjaya?
Seksyen 152 Kanun Tanah memperuntukkan prosedur di dalam ketiadaan pembida, yakni seperti berikut;
When no bid has been made at or above the reserve price, it shall be lawful for the court to adjourn the sale and to order that the land be again put up for auction with the same or with a reduced reserve price.
Provided that, in every case, it shall be the duty of the court to have the time of the sale publicly notified by advertisement and in such other manner as shall be advisable, or shall be regulated by any rules made under this Code, or by order of the court.
Di dalam kes Bank Utama (Malaysia) Bhd v. Chai Koh Shon & Sons Sdn Bhd, [2003] 1 CLJ 264, telah merujuk kepada peruntukan ini dan memutuskan tiada peruntukan di dalam seksyen tersebut yang menyatakan keperluan untuk Defendan hadir di mahkamah sekiranya mahkamah menetapkan tarikh baru untuk jualan tanah tersebut.
Selain itu, perintah jualan hanya dibenarkan sekiranya kelihatan adil untuk membenarkan (as in the circumstances seems just). Perkara ini selaras dengan peruntukan seksyen 148(2) Kanun Tanah yang menyatakan seperti berikut;
"(2) If the chargor fails to comply with the requirement of any notice lawfully given, the charger shall be at liberty to apply to the High Court:-
(a) for an order entitling him to enter into possession and be registered as proprietor of the charged land;
(b) to receive the rents and profits of the charged land; and
(c) for a sale of the charged land,
and the Court after hearing the evidence may make such order as in the circumstances seems just: (penekanan ditambah).
Merujuk kepada otoriti di dalam kes Affin Bank Berhad v. Woodhouse Sdn Bhd [2006] 1 LNS 307, di mana YA Datuk Clement Skinner J (pada waktu itu) di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuching memutuskan membenarkan perintah jualan terhadap tanah tersebut kerana tidak wujud keadaan yang tidak adil didalam kes ini setelah menimbangkan segala keterangan yang ada.
Oleh itu adalah jelas bahawa Mahkamah tidak dihalang untuk membenarkan perintah jualan tersebut sekiranya Saman Minta Arahan difailkan dalam ketiadaan Defendan.
iii. Keadaan bagaimanakah jualan secara lelongan awam masih terpakai?
Adalah satu notis penghakiman untuk menyatakan bahawa di dalam kes-kes loan assignment cum assignment (LACA), peruntukan prosedural di bawah Aturan 83 KMT 1980 tidak terpakai di dalam kes gadai janji. Perkara ini selari dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Philieo Allied Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v. Bupinder Singh Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 CLJ 621 di mana Yang Arif Abdul Malek Ishak HMP (pada waktu itu) memutuskan;
Peruntukan prosedural A. 83 KKMT yang dipakai dalam tindakan caj tidak terpakai kepada gadai janji. Dalam hukum adat, pemegang gadai janji disisi undang-undang atau pemegang gadai janji ekuiti mempunyai kuasa menjual dan menyerahkan hartanah kepada pihak ketiga secara sah tanpa satu perintah mahkamah sekiranya penggadai janji mungkir dalam pembayaran balik menurut terma nyata surat ikatan gadai janji.
Di dalam kes Chai Koh Shon v. Public Bank Berhad [2004] 3 CLJ 189, Mahkamah Rayuan (rayuan daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Miri) telah dihadapkan dengan dua persoalan; yang mana persoalan kedua relevan untuk dibentangkan, yakni sama ada mahkamah mempunyai kuasa di bawah Aturan 83 KMT 1980 atau di bawah kuasa budibicara untuk memerintahkan perintah jualan secara persendirian (private treaty). Mahkamah Rayuan telah menolak rayuan hanya atas isu yang pertama tanpa mahu memberi jawapan yang konklusi untuk isu kedua tersebut. Walaupun demikian, adalah sesuai untuk merujuk kepada sebahagian daripada penghakiman Mahkamah yang berbunyi seperti berikut;
In general, and mindful again that the chargor remains on the register as the registered proprietor of the charged land, and that it is an incident of such proprietorship that the chargor has the right to deal with the charged land including its disposal by private treaty subject to the consent of the chargee, there is no need for the legislature to intervene on his behalf in this regard and in that sense perhaps it is not incorrect to say that there is no express provision in Cap. 81 (Sarawak). For the chargor what the legislature did, was to enact s. 145 of Cap. 81 (Sarawak) to declare the chargor's right to redeem the charged land.
Any sale of these lots by the appellant, as chargor, by way of private treaty to a third party during the currency of these charges must come under cl. 16 of the registered instrument and s. 143(2) and (3) of Cap. 81 (Sarawak) and be governed thereby. The sale we speak of here is no other than a sale the proceeds whereof are intended to be paid to the chargee in order to discharge the registered charges. Such a sale may be concluded at any time before or after the respondent, as chargee, commences proceedings in the High Court under s. 148. In either case, such a sale must be with the prior consent in writing of the chargee in terms of cl. 16 and s. 143(2) and (3) without which the sale and transfer would be ineffectual and unregistrable. To that extent Cap. 81 (Sarawak) may be said to provide indirectly for such a sale by the chargor with the consent of the chargee while directly protecting the legal interests of the chargee.
In the case of such a sale by the chargor to a third party with the requisite consent of the chargee taking place before the commencement of proceedings under s. 148, the sale transaction is strictly a private business matter between the chargor, the chargee and the third party. It does not concern the court and there is nothing in Cap. 81 (Sarawak) to say that an order of sale or approval of the court is required.
Apa yang penting di dalam kes ini sekiranya terdapat jualan secara persendirian, ianya tidak memerlukan pengesahan atau kebenaran daripada Mahkamah asal sahaja transaksi tersebut dilakukan selaras dengan peruntukan di dalam terma caj atau gadaian tersebut dan dipersetujui oleh kedua belah pihak.
iv Kenapa ada ketikanya sesetengah pihak masih lagi memilih untuk jualan lelong dibandingkan dengan sistem tender?
Secara am di Sarawak, kebanyakan kes yang mendapat perintah jualan di Mahkamah Tinggi adalah secara sistem tender. Walaupun demikian, dalam keadaan-keadaan khas, terdapat juga pihak tertentu yang masih memohon untuk jualan secara lelong. Contohnya disebabkan oleh faktor kos dan lokasi. Bagi kes-kes di Mahkamah Tinggi Limbang umpamanya, sebahagian peguam akan memohon untuk jualan secara lelongan awam kerana pelelong yang dilantik biasanya berdaftar di Miri. Sekiranya menggunakan tender, kos yang terlibat adalah lebih tinggi kerana pelelong tersebut perlu berulang alik dari Miri ke Limbang lebih kerap untuk tujuan penerimaan tender tersebut jika dibandingkan dengan lelongan awam.
5. Statistik kes-kes yang menggunakan sistem tender di Sarawak
Bagi mahkamah-mahkamah seluruh negeri Sarawak, statistik menunjukkan setiap Mahkamah Tinggi mengguna pakai sistem tender. Bagi kajian selama 5 tahun bermula dari 2006 sehingga Februari, 2011 terdapat 2635 kes yang telah menggunakan sistem tender. Tetapi bagi Mahkamah Tinggi Limbang seperti yang telah dinyatakan, jumlahnya hanyalah 15 kes bagi tempoh yang sama berbanding sejumlah 86 kes yang menggunakan lelongan awam bagi tempoh itu.
6. Kesimpulan
Oleh itu, berdasarkan senario yang telah diutarakan, dapatlah dihujahkan sistem tender yang telah diamalkan di negeri Sarawak dalam banyak hal dan keadaan lebih sesuai digunapakai bagi kes-kes tanah bercagar atau caj (charged land). Khasnya di negeri-negeri yang maju di mana hartanah yang mempunyai nilai yang tinggi di pasaran sentiasa 'panas' dan menjadi rebutan. Adalah dicadangkan agar Kanun Tanah Negara dipinda dengan memasukkan klausa yang memperuntukkan penggunaan tender bagi kes-kes gadaian (charged land) yang didaftarkan di Mahkamah Tinggi. Dengan ketelusan sistem ini, ianya membolehkan hartanah tersebut terjual mengikut kuasa pasaran dan elemen samseng dapat dikurangkan. Lantaran itu, bilamana hartanah tersebut terjual dengan harga yang sewajarnya, ianya sudah pasti mengurangkan beban Defendan dalam membayar balik baki tunggakan pinjaman tersebut.
* Timbalan Pendaftar/Pegawai Penyelidik Mahkamah Tinggi Miri
RUJUKAN KES-KES DAN ARTIKEL:
Suresh Emmanuel Abishegam & Anor v. RHB Bank Berhad [2010] 4 CLJ 685
Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 2 CLJ 36
United Malayan Banking Corporation v. Hassim Hj Ladis & Ors, [2001] 8 CLJ 775
Bank Utama (Malaysia) Bhd v. Chai Koh Shon & Sons Sdn Bhd, [2003] 1 CLJ 264
Affin Bank Berhad v. Woodhouse Sdn Bhd [2006] 1 LNS 307
Philieo Allied Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v. Bupinder Singh Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 CLJ 621
Chai Koh Shon v. Public Bank Berhad [2004] 3 CLJ 189
Goh Leng Chua, Nature of Charges and Caveats Under the Sarawak Land Code (Cap 81), [1995] 2 CLJ xliii (May)
RUJUKAN STATUT & PEKELILING:
Perlembagaan Persekutuan
Kanun Tanah Negara
Kanun Tanah Sarawak (Bab 81)
Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980
Surat Arahan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Sabah dan Sarawak bertarikh 21.11.2008, no rujukan (49) dlm RHC/C/134
STATISTIK KES-KES YANG MENGGUNAKAN SISTEM TENDER DI SELURUH SARAWAK MULAI 2006- FEB, 2011
MAHKAMAH TINGGI I KUCHING
2006
105
2007
173
2008
120
2009
108
2010
38
Feb 2011
Nil
* Dlm tahun 2011, Mahkamah Tinggi 1 beroperasi secara T-track sepenuh masa (mendengar perbicaran sahaja)
MAHKAMAH TINGGI II KUCHING
2006
89
2007
109
2008
104
2009
110
2010
87
Feb 2011
108
MAHKAMAH TINGGI III KUCHING
2006
94
2007
117
2008
125
2009
108
2010
87
Feb 2011
16
MAHKAMAH TINGGI SIBU
TAHUN
JUMLAH
2006
-
2007
-
2008
-
2009
9
2010
46
Feb 2011
7
MAHKAMAH TINGGI BINTULU
TAHUN
JUMLAH
2006
113
2007
110
2008
70
2009
48
2010
43
Feb 2011
4
MAHKAMAH TINGGI MIRI
TAHUN
JUMLAH
2006
150
2007
119
2008
73
2009
64
2010
64
Feb 2011
3
MAHKAMAH TINGGI LIMBANG
TAHUN
JUMLAH
2006
2
2007
0
2008
3
2009
2
2010
6
Feb 2011
2
MAHKAMAH-MAHKAMAH SARAWAK
TAHUN
JUMLAH
2006
553
2007
628
2008
494
2009
449
2010
371
Feb 2011
140
JUMLAH KESELURUHAN
2635
Sumber: Unit Statistik Mahkamah Sarawak
Endnotes:
[1] Cara penyerahan notis adalah seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 208 Kanun Tanah. Ianya bersamaan konsep penyerahan Borang 16D di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara.
[2]Seksyen 148(2)(c) Kanun Tanah
[3] Goh Leng Chua, Nature of Charges and Caveats Under the Sarawak Land Code (Cap 81), (1995) 2 CLJ xliii (May)
[4] Mahkamah dalam konteks ini merujuk kepada Pendaftar, yang lazimnya terdiri daripada Timbalan Pendaftar atau Penolong Kanan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi yang mana berkenaan.
[5] Surat arahan daripada Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Sabah dan Sarawak bertarikh 21.11.2008, no rujukan (49) dlm RHC/C/134.
by
MUSYIRI PEET
[2011] 1 LNS(A) xxv
MALAYSIA
1. Pengenalan-latar belakang
Apabila memperkatakan tentang sistem perundangan di negeri Sarawak, khususnya perihal tanah, kedudukannya agak berlainan dan tersendiri berbanding negeri-negeri lain. Parlimen melalui Perkara 95D dan 95E Perlembagaan Persekutuan telah memberi kelonggaran kepada kedua-dua negeri ini untuk tidak terikat dengan polisi yang ditetapkan oleh Majlis Tanah Kebangsaan di peringkat Persekutuan. Oleh yang demikian, di dalam kajian ini, undang-undang yang terpakai adalah Kanun Tanah Sarawak (Bab 81) (selepas daripada ini dirujuk sebagai "Kanun Tanah"). Setakat perlu, perbandingan akan dibuat dengan Kanun Tanah Negara. Walau bagaimanapun, rujukan kepada Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (selepas daripada ini dirujuk sebagai "KMT 1980"), adalah sesuatu yang mustahak kerana kebanyakan kes-kes jualan tanah secara bercagar (charge land) adalah di bawah bidangkuasa Mahkamah Tinggi.
Di dalam kajian ini juga, akan dihuraikan lebih lanjut tentang prosedur sistem tender, kelebihan dan kekurangan jika dibandingkan dengan lelongan awam, isu-isu yang timbul, rujukan nas undang-undang dan di mana perlu dilampirkan statistik kes-kes yang mengaplikasikan sistem tender di Sarawak.
2. Prosedur Bagi Sistem Tender
i. Sebelum Perintah Jualan
Secara ringkas, prosedur sebelum mendapatkan perintah jualan adalah seperti berikut. Apabila berlakunya kemungkiran atau kegagalan defendan atau defendan-defendan untuk membuat bayaran prinsipal sepertimana yang dipersetujui di dalam gadaian, maka pihak Plaintiff akan menyerahkan satu bentuk notis yang dikenali sebagai notis statutori sepertimana yang dikehendaki di dalam Seksyen 148(1) Kanun Tanah kepada defendan atau penggadai (chargee)[1] selaras dengan terma gadaian itu selain daripada notis tuntutan daripada peguam. Sekiranya pihak Defendan masih enggan menjelaskan tunggakan tersebut, pihak Plaintiff atau pemegang gadaian (chargor) akan memfailkan tuntutan di Mahkamah Tinggi untuk mendapatkan relif-relif yang berpatutan termasuk perintah jualan terhadap tanah tersebut[2]. Satu saman pemula akan difailkan selaras dengan Aturan 83 Kaedah 1(1)(b) dan (3) KMT 1980. Dengan andaian semua suratcara adalah teratur, satu perintah jualan akan diperolehi daripada Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. Perintah jualan ini berlandaskan kepada peruntukan seksyen 150(1) Kanun Tanah yang berbunyi seperti berikut;
...The sale shall be by public auction or tender or such other mode of sale as may be directed by the court subject to such conditions of sale as shall be approved by the court. The court shall also fix the date of the sale, which shall be not less than 30 days from the date of the order of sale, and shall authorize such other acts as may be necessary for the conduct of sale. A reserve price shall be put on the land which shall be approximately equal to its estimated fair market value.
Klausa undang-undang inilah yang menzahirkan sistem tender di Sarawak yang dipercayai tidak terdapat di dalam peruntukan Kanun Tanah Negara. Kanun Tanah Negara hanya memperuntukkan jualan secara lelongan awam sepertimana yang dinyatakan di dalam seksyen 257(1)(a) KTN. Sebaliknya, seksyen 150(1) Kanun Tanah sebenarnya memberikan option sama ada memohon jualan secara lelongan awam atau menggunakan tender. Dari segi sejarah, sebelum 1994, seksyen 150 hanya memperuntukkan lelongan secara awam sahaja tetapi melalui Ordinan Kanun Tanah (Pindaan) 1994 (Am. Cap. A17)[3] yang digazetkan pada 23.6.1994 telah memasukkan frasa tersebut, iaitu "or tender or such other mode of sale as may be directed by the court".
ii. Selepas Perintah Jualan
Selanjutnya, selepas Perintah Jualan diperoleh, sepertimana lazim, peguam Plaintiff akan memfailkan Saman Minta Arahan (SFD) selaras dengan Kaedah 25 KMT 1980 dan tarikh pendengaran akan ditetapkan. Pada tarikh tersebut, sekiranya permohonan SFD dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah[4], maka pihak mahkamah akan menetapkan tarikh untuk penerimaan tender dan penutupan tender. Lazimnya dalam sebulan setengah ke dua bulan daripada tarikh perintah. Tempoh tender pula adalah selama 2 minggu atau 17 hari (jika mengambil kira hari Sabtu dan Ahad). Contoh seperti berikut, perintah SFD diberikan pada 1.1.2011. Tender akan diterima mulai 7.3.2011, hari Isnin, pukul 8.30 pagi sehingga tender ditutup pada hari Rabu, 3.30 petang, 23.3.2011. Tender kemudian akan dibuka pada 24.3.2011, hari Khamis, jam 10.00 pagi.
Sebelum tiba tarikh penerimaan tender, tugas pelelong yang dilantik oleh mahkamah adalah sama sebagaimana di dalam lelongan awam, yakni termasuk menyediakan laporan penilaian bagi menentukan kadar yang munasabah untuk harga pasaran hartanah tersebut. Selain itu, notis jualan dan proclamation of sale juga perlu diiklankan dan ditampal di Papan Kenyataan Mahkamah untuk memaklumkan kepada orang ramai yang berminat untuk membeli hartanah itu.
Bakal pembeli yang berminat hendaklah menyediakan bank draft yang bernilai sekurang-kurangnya 10% daripada nilai harga pasaran tersebut. Bank draft tersebut akan dimasukkan di dalam sampul surat termetri dan dialamatkan kepada Timbalan Pendaftar atau Penolong Kanan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi yang mana berkenaan. Apabila tempoh tender mula dibuka, sampul surat tersebut akan dimasukkan di dalam kotak peti berkunci yang tersedia di pejabat pendaftaran atau bilik lelong Mahkamah yang berkenaan. Kunci tersebut mempunyai tiga anak kunci yang mana hanya boleh dibuka sekiranya kesemua kunci itu digunakan serentak. Kunci tersebut dipegang oleh tiga pihak yang berlainan, iaitu peguam Plaintiff, pelelong yang dilantik dan bailif mahkamah. Pada hari pembukaan tender, bakal pembeli yang meletakkan nilaian bank draft tertinggi akan diisytiharkan oleh pelelong sebagai berjaya memenangi tender tersebut dan dikehendaki menjelaskan baki bayaran di dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan. Setiap proses ini akan diawasi oleh pegawai Mahkamah sama ada Timbalan Pendaftar atau Pendaftar Mahkamah Rendah yang berkenaan.
3. Kelebihan sistem tender
Kelebihan yang paling ketara di dalam sistem tender adalah tahap ketelusan bakal pembeli atau pembida. Di dalam sistem lelongan awam, peluang untuk manipulasi terbuka luas kerana kewujudan sesetengah sindiket yang cuba menganggu pembeli atau pembida bona-fide. Pihak-pihak ini akan bertindak sebagai "pemain atau player" dengan menjadi pembida untuk hartanah yang sama yang menjadi tumpuan dan cuba mempengaruhi pembida yang suci hati untuk tidak membida semasa proses lelongan awam tersebut walaupun telah mendepositkan wang pertaruhan. Natijahnya, pembida yang suci hati akan terganggu dan hartanah tersebut sukar untuk dijual mengikut kehendak kuasa pasaran yang sewajarnya.
Tetapi sebaliknya di dalam sistem tender, proses penjualan hartanah tersebut berjalan lancar kerana ketelusan sistemnya. Hartanah tersebut dapat terjual sepertimana kehendak kuasa pasaran. Mana-mana pihak tidak mengetahui siapa bakal pembeli yang layak atau memenangi tender tersebut sehingga kesemua sampul surat tersebut dibuka serentak pada hari pembukaan tender. Malah semasa pembukaan sampul surat tersebut, ianya akan disaksikan oleh kesemua pihak, sama ada bakal pembeli, peguam Plaintiff, pelelong dan pegawai serta bailif mahkamah. Tidak timbul soal sindiket dalam hal ini.
Malah menyedari peri pentingnya sistem tender ini, Hakim Besar Sabah dan Sarawak, YAA Tan Sri Datuk Sri Panglima Rirchard Malanjum telah mengarahkan agar semua jualan tanah di Sarawak dibuat secara tender dan tidak lagi melalui lelongan awam[5].
4. Isu-Isu Yang Timbul
i. Adakah perintah jualan di dalam sistem tender boleh diketepikan?
Di dalam sistem lelongan awam, terdapat peruntukan untuk mengenepikan perintah jualan, yakni di bawah seksyen 256(3) KTN yang berbunyi seperti berikut;
On any such application, the Court shall order the sale of the land or lease to which the charge relates unless it is satisfied of the existence of cause to the contrary (penekanan ditambah).
Tafsiran lebih lanjut tentang "cause to the contrary" telah dinyatakan di dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan, Suresh Emmanuel Abishegam & Anor v. RHB Bank Berhad [2010] 4 CLJ 685. Kes ini telah memperincikan apakah ujian atau standard yang perlu dipenuhi bagi maksud mencapai "cause to the contrary" tersebut. Yang Arif Kang Hwee Gee JCA (pada waktu itu) setelah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Agung di dalam Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 2 CLJ 36, menyatakan;
(i) where the chargor is able to successfully impeach the chargee's title to the charge to any of the grounds provided in s. 340 of the Code;
(ii) where there is a failure on the part of the chargee to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale;
(iii) where to grant an order for sale would contravene some rule of law or equity.
Sungguhpun demikian, apakah kedudukannya di dalam Kanun Tanah di Sarawak? Hal ini kerana peruntukan "cause to the contrary" sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di dalam seksyen 256(3) KTN tidak dinyatakan di sini. Di dalam hal ini, rujukan keputusan nas undang-undang adalah perlu. Di dalam kes di Mahkamah Tinggi Miri, Sarawak, yakni kes United Malayan Banking Corporation v. Hassim Hj Ladis & Ors, [2001] 8 CLJ 775, peguam Plaintiff telah membawa perhatian mahkamah untuk merujuk kepada peruntukan Seksyen 256 KTN sama ada adakah adil untuk membenarkan perintah jualan atau wujudnya "cause to the contrary". Peguam Plaintiff berhujah bahawa prinsip ini harus digunapakai di dalam permohonan di bawah seksyen 148(2)(c) Kanun Tanah. YA Sulaiman Daud JC (pada waktu itu) memutuskan bersetuju dengan pendapat peguam Plaintiff bahawa prinsip yang sama harus terpakai bagi peruntukan ini ketika mendengar permohonan untuk perintah jualan.
Oleh itu, berlandaskan kepada nas-nas undang-undang tersebut, maka isu tersebut dijawab secara afirmatif.
ii. Adakah Defendan perlu dimaklumkan sekali lagi di dalam tender yang kedua sekiranya tender yang pertama tidak berjaya?
Seksyen 152 Kanun Tanah memperuntukkan prosedur di dalam ketiadaan pembida, yakni seperti berikut;
When no bid has been made at or above the reserve price, it shall be lawful for the court to adjourn the sale and to order that the land be again put up for auction with the same or with a reduced reserve price.
Provided that, in every case, it shall be the duty of the court to have the time of the sale publicly notified by advertisement and in such other manner as shall be advisable, or shall be regulated by any rules made under this Code, or by order of the court.
Di dalam kes Bank Utama (Malaysia) Bhd v. Chai Koh Shon & Sons Sdn Bhd, [2003] 1 CLJ 264, telah merujuk kepada peruntukan ini dan memutuskan tiada peruntukan di dalam seksyen tersebut yang menyatakan keperluan untuk Defendan hadir di mahkamah sekiranya mahkamah menetapkan tarikh baru untuk jualan tanah tersebut.
Selain itu, perintah jualan hanya dibenarkan sekiranya kelihatan adil untuk membenarkan (as in the circumstances seems just). Perkara ini selaras dengan peruntukan seksyen 148(2) Kanun Tanah yang menyatakan seperti berikut;
"(2) If the chargor fails to comply with the requirement of any notice lawfully given, the charger shall be at liberty to apply to the High Court:-
(a) for an order entitling him to enter into possession and be registered as proprietor of the charged land;
(b) to receive the rents and profits of the charged land; and
(c) for a sale of the charged land,
and the Court after hearing the evidence may make such order as in the circumstances seems just: (penekanan ditambah).
Merujuk kepada otoriti di dalam kes Affin Bank Berhad v. Woodhouse Sdn Bhd [2006] 1 LNS 307, di mana YA Datuk Clement Skinner J (pada waktu itu) di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuching memutuskan membenarkan perintah jualan terhadap tanah tersebut kerana tidak wujud keadaan yang tidak adil didalam kes ini setelah menimbangkan segala keterangan yang ada.
Oleh itu adalah jelas bahawa Mahkamah tidak dihalang untuk membenarkan perintah jualan tersebut sekiranya Saman Minta Arahan difailkan dalam ketiadaan Defendan.
iii. Keadaan bagaimanakah jualan secara lelongan awam masih terpakai?
Adalah satu notis penghakiman untuk menyatakan bahawa di dalam kes-kes loan assignment cum assignment (LACA), peruntukan prosedural di bawah Aturan 83 KMT 1980 tidak terpakai di dalam kes gadai janji. Perkara ini selari dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Philieo Allied Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v. Bupinder Singh Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 CLJ 621 di mana Yang Arif Abdul Malek Ishak HMP (pada waktu itu) memutuskan;
Peruntukan prosedural A. 83 KKMT yang dipakai dalam tindakan caj tidak terpakai kepada gadai janji. Dalam hukum adat, pemegang gadai janji disisi undang-undang atau pemegang gadai janji ekuiti mempunyai kuasa menjual dan menyerahkan hartanah kepada pihak ketiga secara sah tanpa satu perintah mahkamah sekiranya penggadai janji mungkir dalam pembayaran balik menurut terma nyata surat ikatan gadai janji.
Di dalam kes Chai Koh Shon v. Public Bank Berhad [2004] 3 CLJ 189, Mahkamah Rayuan (rayuan daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Miri) telah dihadapkan dengan dua persoalan; yang mana persoalan kedua relevan untuk dibentangkan, yakni sama ada mahkamah mempunyai kuasa di bawah Aturan 83 KMT 1980 atau di bawah kuasa budibicara untuk memerintahkan perintah jualan secara persendirian (private treaty). Mahkamah Rayuan telah menolak rayuan hanya atas isu yang pertama tanpa mahu memberi jawapan yang konklusi untuk isu kedua tersebut. Walaupun demikian, adalah sesuai untuk merujuk kepada sebahagian daripada penghakiman Mahkamah yang berbunyi seperti berikut;
In general, and mindful again that the chargor remains on the register as the registered proprietor of the charged land, and that it is an incident of such proprietorship that the chargor has the right to deal with the charged land including its disposal by private treaty subject to the consent of the chargee, there is no need for the legislature to intervene on his behalf in this regard and in that sense perhaps it is not incorrect to say that there is no express provision in Cap. 81 (Sarawak). For the chargor what the legislature did, was to enact s. 145 of Cap. 81 (Sarawak) to declare the chargor's right to redeem the charged land.
Any sale of these lots by the appellant, as chargor, by way of private treaty to a third party during the currency of these charges must come under cl. 16 of the registered instrument and s. 143(2) and (3) of Cap. 81 (Sarawak) and be governed thereby. The sale we speak of here is no other than a sale the proceeds whereof are intended to be paid to the chargee in order to discharge the registered charges. Such a sale may be concluded at any time before or after the respondent, as chargee, commences proceedings in the High Court under s. 148. In either case, such a sale must be with the prior consent in writing of the chargee in terms of cl. 16 and s. 143(2) and (3) without which the sale and transfer would be ineffectual and unregistrable. To that extent Cap. 81 (Sarawak) may be said to provide indirectly for such a sale by the chargor with the consent of the chargee while directly protecting the legal interests of the chargee.
In the case of such a sale by the chargor to a third party with the requisite consent of the chargee taking place before the commencement of proceedings under s. 148, the sale transaction is strictly a private business matter between the chargor, the chargee and the third party. It does not concern the court and there is nothing in Cap. 81 (Sarawak) to say that an order of sale or approval of the court is required.
Apa yang penting di dalam kes ini sekiranya terdapat jualan secara persendirian, ianya tidak memerlukan pengesahan atau kebenaran daripada Mahkamah asal sahaja transaksi tersebut dilakukan selaras dengan peruntukan di dalam terma caj atau gadaian tersebut dan dipersetujui oleh kedua belah pihak.
iv Kenapa ada ketikanya sesetengah pihak masih lagi memilih untuk jualan lelong dibandingkan dengan sistem tender?
Secara am di Sarawak, kebanyakan kes yang mendapat perintah jualan di Mahkamah Tinggi adalah secara sistem tender. Walaupun demikian, dalam keadaan-keadaan khas, terdapat juga pihak tertentu yang masih memohon untuk jualan secara lelong. Contohnya disebabkan oleh faktor kos dan lokasi. Bagi kes-kes di Mahkamah Tinggi Limbang umpamanya, sebahagian peguam akan memohon untuk jualan secara lelongan awam kerana pelelong yang dilantik biasanya berdaftar di Miri. Sekiranya menggunakan tender, kos yang terlibat adalah lebih tinggi kerana pelelong tersebut perlu berulang alik dari Miri ke Limbang lebih kerap untuk tujuan penerimaan tender tersebut jika dibandingkan dengan lelongan awam.
5. Statistik kes-kes yang menggunakan sistem tender di Sarawak
Bagi mahkamah-mahkamah seluruh negeri Sarawak, statistik menunjukkan setiap Mahkamah Tinggi mengguna pakai sistem tender. Bagi kajian selama 5 tahun bermula dari 2006 sehingga Februari, 2011 terdapat 2635 kes yang telah menggunakan sistem tender. Tetapi bagi Mahkamah Tinggi Limbang seperti yang telah dinyatakan, jumlahnya hanyalah 15 kes bagi tempoh yang sama berbanding sejumlah 86 kes yang menggunakan lelongan awam bagi tempoh itu.
6. Kesimpulan
Oleh itu, berdasarkan senario yang telah diutarakan, dapatlah dihujahkan sistem tender yang telah diamalkan di negeri Sarawak dalam banyak hal dan keadaan lebih sesuai digunapakai bagi kes-kes tanah bercagar atau caj (charged land). Khasnya di negeri-negeri yang maju di mana hartanah yang mempunyai nilai yang tinggi di pasaran sentiasa 'panas' dan menjadi rebutan. Adalah dicadangkan agar Kanun Tanah Negara dipinda dengan memasukkan klausa yang memperuntukkan penggunaan tender bagi kes-kes gadaian (charged land) yang didaftarkan di Mahkamah Tinggi. Dengan ketelusan sistem ini, ianya membolehkan hartanah tersebut terjual mengikut kuasa pasaran dan elemen samseng dapat dikurangkan. Lantaran itu, bilamana hartanah tersebut terjual dengan harga yang sewajarnya, ianya sudah pasti mengurangkan beban Defendan dalam membayar balik baki tunggakan pinjaman tersebut.
* Timbalan Pendaftar/Pegawai Penyelidik Mahkamah Tinggi Miri
RUJUKAN KES-KES DAN ARTIKEL:
Suresh Emmanuel Abishegam & Anor v. RHB Bank Berhad [2010] 4 CLJ 685
Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 2 CLJ 36
United Malayan Banking Corporation v. Hassim Hj Ladis & Ors, [2001] 8 CLJ 775
Bank Utama (Malaysia) Bhd v. Chai Koh Shon & Sons Sdn Bhd, [2003] 1 CLJ 264
Affin Bank Berhad v. Woodhouse Sdn Bhd [2006] 1 LNS 307
Philieo Allied Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v. Bupinder Singh Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 CLJ 621
Chai Koh Shon v. Public Bank Berhad [2004] 3 CLJ 189
Goh Leng Chua, Nature of Charges and Caveats Under the Sarawak Land Code (Cap 81), [1995] 2 CLJ xliii (May)
RUJUKAN STATUT & PEKELILING:
Perlembagaan Persekutuan
Kanun Tanah Negara
Kanun Tanah Sarawak (Bab 81)
Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980
Surat Arahan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Sabah dan Sarawak bertarikh 21.11.2008, no rujukan (49) dlm RHC/C/134
STATISTIK KES-KES YANG MENGGUNAKAN SISTEM TENDER DI SELURUH SARAWAK MULAI 2006- FEB, 2011
MAHKAMAH TINGGI I KUCHING
2006
105
2007
173
2008
120
2009
108
2010
38
Feb 2011
Nil
* Dlm tahun 2011, Mahkamah Tinggi 1 beroperasi secara T-track sepenuh masa (mendengar perbicaran sahaja)
MAHKAMAH TINGGI II KUCHING
2006
89
2007
109
2008
104
2009
110
2010
87
Feb 2011
108
MAHKAMAH TINGGI III KUCHING
2006
94
2007
117
2008
125
2009
108
2010
87
Feb 2011
16
MAHKAMAH TINGGI SIBU
TAHUN
JUMLAH
2006
-
2007
-
2008
-
2009
9
2010
46
Feb 2011
7
MAHKAMAH TINGGI BINTULU
TAHUN
JUMLAH
2006
113
2007
110
2008
70
2009
48
2010
43
Feb 2011
4
MAHKAMAH TINGGI MIRI
TAHUN
JUMLAH
2006
150
2007
119
2008
73
2009
64
2010
64
Feb 2011
3
MAHKAMAH TINGGI LIMBANG
TAHUN
JUMLAH
2006
2
2007
0
2008
3
2009
2
2010
6
Feb 2011
2
MAHKAMAH-MAHKAMAH SARAWAK
TAHUN
JUMLAH
2006
553
2007
628
2008
494
2009
449
2010
371
Feb 2011
140
JUMLAH KESELURUHAN
2635
Sumber: Unit Statistik Mahkamah Sarawak
Endnotes:
[1] Cara penyerahan notis adalah seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 208 Kanun Tanah. Ianya bersamaan konsep penyerahan Borang 16D di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara.
[2]Seksyen 148(2)(c) Kanun Tanah
[3] Goh Leng Chua, Nature of Charges and Caveats Under the Sarawak Land Code (Cap 81), (1995) 2 CLJ xliii (May)
[4] Mahkamah dalam konteks ini merujuk kepada Pendaftar, yang lazimnya terdiri daripada Timbalan Pendaftar atau Penolong Kanan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi yang mana berkenaan.
[5] Surat arahan daripada Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Sabah dan Sarawak bertarikh 21.11.2008, no rujukan (49) dlm RHC/C/134.
Osama killed
President Obama personally chaired a half-dozen National Security Council meetings on the extremely classified intelligence in recent weeks, U.S. officials said, culminating in his Friday orders to proceed with the operation that killed Bin Laden.
dipetik drpd yahoonews.
Macam cerita 24 plk...jack bauer la field agent kot...betul ke osama laden dah mati...timbul pulak berita bhw ini semua rekaan amerika..gambar osama mati disahkan super impose...adakah ini satu cara amerika nak masuk ke pakistan secara kekerasan dgn menuduh pakistan bersekongkol dgn osama?
tunggu dan lihat sambungan cerita polis dunia ini.
dipetik drpd yahoonews.
Macam cerita 24 plk...jack bauer la field agent kot...betul ke osama laden dah mati...timbul pulak berita bhw ini semua rekaan amerika..gambar osama mati disahkan super impose...adakah ini satu cara amerika nak masuk ke pakistan secara kekerasan dgn menuduh pakistan bersekongkol dgn osama?
tunggu dan lihat sambungan cerita polis dunia ini.
Zina
"Orang berbuat bala cara laki-laki perempuan satitah Dewata Maha Raya jika merdeka bujang palu seratus rotan. Jika merdeka beristeri atau perempuan bersuami ditanam hinggakan pinggang dihambalang dengan batu matikan."
- Batu Bersurat Terengganu, 22 Februari 1303
Batu bersurat ini ada tulis pasal tuduhan zina tak?
Bangkitan Marah
Dalam kes Lim Eng Kiat,tertuduh telah membunuh isterinya dengan mencekik sehingga mati. Isteri tertuduh dalam kes itu telah melakukan zina (adultery) dan telah memperli tertuduh dengan mengatakan saiz kemaluan tertuduh kecil dan tidak menyeronokkan. Isteri tertuduh berkata "Yes, I went out every night and (had sex). And what is more, your penis is too small and you are no fun". Kata-kata isteri tertuduh tersebut telah diterima oleh mahkamah sebagai satu bangkitan marah yang besar dan mengejut sehingga tertuduh hilang kawalan dirinya.
Jangan Sesekali Percaya Orang Asing
RAZALI HAMZAH lwn. PP
MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, MUAR
AHMADI ASNAWI PK
[RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: 42-10-2004]
20 FEBRUARI 2010
PENGHAKIMAN
Ahmadi Asnawi PK:
[1] Perayu telah dituduh merogol seorang perempuan Melayu, SP1, (selepas ini disebut sebagai 'mangsa') yang ketika itu berumur 24 tahun di dalam ladang kelapa sawit, Batu 13, Jalan Bakri, Air Hitam, Muar, pada 21 Ogos 1998; suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum dibawah s. 376 Kanun Keseksaan. Beliau telah didapati bersalah oleh Mahkamah Sesyen, Muar dan telah dihukum selama 16 tahun penjara dari tarikh jatuh hukuman (15 Mac 2004) di samping dikenakan sepuluh kali sebatan dengan rotan.
[2] Rayuan ini adalah ke atas kedua-dua sabitan dan hukuman berkenaan.
Fakta Kes Secara Ringkas
[3] Mangsa menyatakan beliau sedang menunggu bas dihadapan Sekolah Menengah Tun Dr Ismail, Bakri, Muar untuk kembali ke rumahnya di Yong Peng setelah menolong datuk saudaranya berniaga di kantin sekolah tersebut pada 21 Ogos 1998 kira-kira jam 11.30 pagi. Semasa menunggu tersebut, sebuah kereta jenis Toyota Corolla dengan nombor pendaftaran BBC 7714 yang dipandu oleh perayu telah berhenti dihadapannya lalu mempelawa mangsa naik keretanya balik ke Yong Peng.
[4] Setelah berkali-kali dipelawa, mangsa akhirnya bersetuju lalu menaiki kereta tersebut. Tambahan pula beliau telah dipesan oleh ibunya supaya balik awal dan hari itu adalah hari Jumaat dan bas jarang lalu.
[5] Dalam perjalanan ke Yong Peng, kereta tersebut telah masuk ke satu lorong ladang kelapa sawit. Perayu memberi alasan hendak berjumpa kawannya di ladang ayam dalam ladang sawit tersebut untuk memberikannya sekeping cek. Setelah sampai ke satu kawasan ladang ayam yang ditinggalkan, perayu telah pusingkan kereta lalu kembali ke jalan besar, menuju kembali ke arah Yong Peng.
[6] Sepuluh minit kemudian perayu telah sekali lagi membelok ke kanan dan masuk ke satu lorong lain dalam ladang kelapa sawit atas alasan yang sama. Mangsa telah mula mengesyaki perayu. Sesampai disatu longgokan tanah merah ditengah-tengah lorong tersebut, perayu telah memberhentikan keretanya. Mangsa cuba keluar daripada kereta tersebut. Walaubagaimana pun perayu telah terlebih dahulu menarik tudungnya dan mencekup mukanya dengan tangannya hingga cermin mata yang dipakainya patah. Perayu juga telah menumbuk mangsa beberapa kali bila berlaku pergelutan diantara mereka.
[7] Perayu kemudian keluar daripada kereta dan menuju ke pintu kereta dimana mangsa berada. Melihatkan demikian mangsa cuba beralih ke bahagian belakang kereta tetapi perayu masih mengasaknya dan berjaya membuka zip seluar jeansnya dan menindihnya. Perayu sudah pun membuka bajunya dan kemudiannya berjaya menanggalkan T-shirt dan coli yang dipakai oleh mangsa. Ketika itu SP1 mendapati dirinya terbaring dilantai di bahagian belakang kereta. Perayu cuba menarik mangsa keluar tetapi gagal.
[8] Akhirnya mangsa berjaya keluar daripada kereta dan cuba melarikan dirinya dengan hanya memakai seluar jeans. Kira-kira 15 kaki dari belakang kereta, perayu berjaya menangkapnya dan dia terjatuh. Disitulah dia dapat melihat nombor pendaftaran kereta tersebut. Perayu kemudian menarik dan berjaya menanggalkan seluar jeans yang dipakai oleh mangsa. Mangsa yang hanya tinggal berpakaian seluar dalam berjaya bangun dan lari sekali lagi namun berjaya ditangkap semula oleh perayu. Beliau telah diheret ke bawah satu pokok kelapa sawit, ditelentangkan, seluar dalamnya ditanggalkan dan terus dirogol. Mangsa tidak berupaya untuk melawan lagi.
Alasan-Alasan Rayuan
[9] Perayu telah mengunjurkan 29 butiran petisyen rayuan. Namun dalam hujahan telah menyimpulkan kepada isu-isu berikut sahaja.
Kelayakan SP6 Untuk Membuat Pemeriksaan Ke Atas Mangsa
[10] Peguambela yang bijaksana menghujah mangsa (SP1) hanya dirujukkan kepada pegawai perubatan (SP6) yang hanya mempunyai pengalaman bekerja selama tiga tahun, pada waktu menjalankan pemeriksaan ke atas mangsa. Sepatutnya mangsa dirujuk kepada pakar ginikologi untuk memperolehi dapatan yang mantap. Dengan itu mangsa telah diperiksa oleh seorang yang tidak layak dan dapatan SP6 tidak mempunyai kredibiliti untuk membantu mahkamah memutuskan samada telah berlaku 
[11] Setelah meneliti keterangan-keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP6, saya berpendapat hujahan di atas adalah hujahan yang amat songsang sekali. Tidak ada keperluan disisi undang-undang bahawa seorang mangsa
[12] Dalam kes ini SP6 telah berkhidmat sebagai pegawai perubatan selama tiga tahun. Beliau berkelulusan daripada University Manipal, India, salah satu universiti perubatan yang diiktiraf sebagai universiti perubatan yang unggul di dunia. SD1, seorang pakar perubatan yang dipanggil oleh pembelaan juga mengakui bahawa SP6 adalah seorang doktor yang berkelayakan penuh dan layak untuk membuat pemeriksaan ke atas mangsa. Jadi apa masalahnya dengan keterangan SP6? Saya mendapati tiada cacat celanya keterangan dan dapatan yang diberikan oleh SP6. Hakim Sesyen yang bijaksana telah menerima keterangan SP6. Atas keseluruhan keterangan yang ada, saya mendapati Hakim Sesyen tidak khilaf bila beliau menerima keterangan SP6 dan mendapati keterangan SP6 telah menyokong "in material particulars" keterangan mangsa bahawa beliau (mangsa) telah dirogol.
Laporan Perubatan Exh. P8 Yang Disediakan Oleh SP6
[13] SP2 adalah pegawai perubatan yang membuat pemeriksaan awalan dan fizikal ke atas mangsa. Beliau memeriksa mangsa kira-kira lima jam selepas kejadian
[14] Dapatan pemeriksaan luaran mangsa oleh SP2 ini tidak dicabar oleh pembelaan.
[15] Selepas membuat pemeriksaan ini SP2 telah merujuk mangsa kepada SP6 dari Bahagian Sakit Puan, Hospital Muar. Ini menurutnya adalah prosedur jabatannya. Beliau juga telah memanjangkan laporan perubatannya dalam bentuk tulisan tangannya kepada SP6.
[16] SP6 mengesahkan segala penemuan luaran/fizikal yang didapati oleh SP2. Dalam pemeriksaan vagina beliau mendapati wujudnya abrasi pada posterior fourchette dan juga koyakkan selaput dara yang baru pada posisi jam 5 dan jam 7. PW6 kemudiannya telah menurunkan dapatannya dalam laporan perubatan exh. P8.
[17] Laporan perubatan ini tidak seharusnya dijadikan bahan pertikaian seperti yang cuba diunjurkan oleh pembelaan. Walau pun pada awalnya SP2 telah memeriksa mangsa dan kemudiannya merujukkan mangsa kepada SP6 bersama-sama dengan laporan awalan dalam bentuk tulisan tangannya sendiri, namun SP6 telah mengulangi pemeriksaan yang telah dilakukan oleh SP2 dan mengesahkan kesemua dapatan SP2. SP6 kemudian telah menyediakan laporan perubatannya seperti exh. P8. Maka dalam keadaan seperti ini untuk segala maksud dan tujuan, exh. P8 adalah disediakan oleh SP6. Maka pengemukaan exh. P8 sebagai exhibit yang disediakan oleh SP6 adalah teratur.
[18] Atas keterangan kedua-dua pegawai perubatan ini, Hakim Sesyen yang bijaksana telah mendapati "corroboration" yang mencukupi bagi menyokong keterangan mangsa bahawa wujud penetrasi ke dalam vagina mangsa iaitu perayu telah memasukkan zakarnya ke dalam vagina mangsa tanpa kerelaan mangsa. Kerelaan mangsa tidak menjadi isu dalam kes ini. Malah keterangan mangsa bahawa beliau tidak pernah merelai perbuatan perayu ke atasnya tidak pernah dicabar oleh perayu.
[19] Atas segala keterangan yang ada termasuk naratif mangsa bagaimana perbuatan
[20] Fakta bahawa mangsa didapati nervous, mengigil dan menangis ketika diperiksa oleh SP2/SP6 adalah konsisten dengan trauma fizikal, mental serta saikologi yang baru dilalui oleh mangsa. Begitu juga fakta bahawa pakaian dan badan mangsa dikotori dengan tanah adalah konsisten dengan keterangan mangsa bahawa beliau telah bergelut dengan perayu di atas tanah sebelum dan semasa kejadian
[21] Abrasi pada posterior fourchette dan koyakkan baru pada selaput dara mengesahkan lagi keterangan mangsa bahawa terdapat kemasukkan zakar perayu ke dalam vagina mangsa. Sememangnya SP6 tidak dapat menyatakan dengan pasti apa yang menyebabkan koyakan kepada selaput dara tersebut. Jawapan beliau adalah satu jawapan yang standard yang lumrah diberikan oleh pegawai-pegawai perubatan meskipun pegawai tersebut adalah pakar dalam bidang tersebut, iaitu koyakkan tersebut adalah konsisten dengan penile penetration, ia juga konsisten dengan finger penetration atau pun penetration oleh blunt cylindrical objects yang lain. Seperti pegawai-pegawai perubatan yang lain SP6 hanya boleh memberikan opinionnya sahaja, kerana beliau tidak nampak apa yang menyebabkan koyakkan tersebut.
[22] Namun punca koyakkan ini hendaklah disiasat dengan mengambilkira keseluruhan keadaan kes, khususnya ia tidak dapat dipisahkan dengan keterangan substantive iaitu keterangan mangsa sendiri. Sehubungan dengannya mangsa menyatakan selepas seluar dalamnya ditanggalkan oleh perayu dalam keadaan dirinya terlentang di atas tanah, kedua-dua kakinya telah dilipatkan dan kemudian ditindih oleh perayu. Beliau cuba menepis zakar perayu ketika perayu cuba memasukkan zakarnya ke dalam vaginanya namun gagal. Kemudian mangsa cuba menutup vaginanya dengan kedua-dua belah tangan tetapi gagal juga setelah ditumbuk oleh perayu. Beliau nampak zakar perayu masuk ke dalam vaginanya. Menurutnya perbuatan
[23] Selepas melihat dan mendengar sendiri mangsa memberi keterangan, Hakim Sesyen yang bijaksana mendapati mangsa adalah seorang yang bercakap benar, memberi keterangan yang konsisten, mempunyai daya intelek yang tinggi serta keterangannya adalah keterangan yang "credible". Beliau telah menerima keterangan mangsa dan mendapati punca koyakan pada selaput dara mangsa adalah berpunca daripada kemasukkan zakar perayu ke dalam vagina mangsa. Ini adalah satu dapatan fakta yang dibuat oleh Hakim Sesyen yang bijaksana setelah melihat dan mendengar sendiri mangsa memberi keterangan. Atas keseluruhan keterangan yang dikemukakan, saya tidak ada asas untuk tidak bersependapat dengan dapatan fakta tersebut dan tidak ada justifikasi kukuh untuk mengubah dapatan fakta tersebut.
[24] Atas premis yang sama saya juga bersependapat bahawa abrasi pada posterior fourchette mangsa adalah berpunca dari "attempts at penetration" seperti diterangkan oleh SP6. Tidak ada asas langsung untuk menyatakan abrasi tersebut adalah berpunca dari kesan garu oleh mangsa sendiri. Abrasi tersebut adalah "proximate in time" dengan koyakkan pada selaput dara mangsa. Maka adalah selamat untuk membuat inferensi bahawa ia adalah berpunca dari insiden yang sama.
Hujahan Peguambela Bijaksana Bahawa Exh. P8 Tidak Menyokong Kejadian
[25] Atas keterangan yang nyata ini peguambela yang bijaksana berhujah bahawa laporan perubatan, exh. P8 dan keterangan SP6 tidak menyokong kejadian
[26] Peguambela juga menghujah bahawa koyakan pada selaput dara adalah keterangan neutral kerana SP6 sendiri bersetuju koyakan tersebut boleh juga berpunca dari kemasukkan jari atau objek-objek tumpul yang lain dan tidak semesti akibat dari kemasukan zakar lelaki. Namun seperti apa yang telah saya nyatakan terdahulu, koyakan selaput dara ini perlu disiasat selari dengan keterangan substantive seperti mana diberikan oleh mangsa (SP1). Mangsa menyatakan beliau nampak zakar perayu masuk ke dalam vaginanya. Keterangan ini diterima oleh Hakim Sesyen yang bijaksana yang melihat dan mendengar sendiri keterangan mangsa. Maka tidak ada pertikaian disini bahawa koyakan selaput dara mangsa adalah disebabkan oleh kemasukan zakar perayu ke dalam vagina mangsa.
[27] Peguambela yang bijaksana juga mempertikaikan 'gait' mangsa yang didapati normal oleh SP6. Tapi apakah yang diharapkan/jangka (expect) oleh peguambela? Adakah peguambela mengharapkan mangsa berjalan dengan terkangkang-kangkang, tertempang-tempang atau merangkak-rangkak akibat insiden
[28] Dengan itu saya menolak hujahan peguambela yang bijaksana berkaitan isu-isu yang diketengahkan ini. Atas segala keterangan yang ada ianya tidak menjadi isu langsung.
Corroboration Dari Saksi-saksi Lain (SP4, SP7 Dan SP8)
[29] Dalam memutuskan wujudnya corroboration yang mencukupi bagi menyokong keterangan mangsa Hakim Sesyen yang bijaksana juga bergantung kepada keterangan-keterangan saksi-saksi lain khususnya SP4, SP7 dan pegawai penyiasat kes, SP8.
SP4
[30] Menurut mangsa, ketika perayu hendak meninggalkan tempat kejadian selepas merogolnya, mangsa yang dalam keadaan telanjang bulat telah merayu kepada perayu supaya meninggalkan pakaian-pakaiannya yang dilucutkan di dalam kereta dan di luar kereta. Permintaan ini telah dipatuhi oleh perayu melainkan seluar dalam mangsa. Seluar dalam mangsa tidak ditemui oleh pegawai penyiasat. Mangsa telah mengenakan pakaiannya semula setelah perayu meninggalkan tempat tersebut. Mangsa kemudian telah berjalan kaki hingga ke jalan besar. SP4 yang ketika itu sedang memandu motosikal dijalan besar tersebut telah berhenti didepan mangsa selepas mangsa melambai-lambai dan meminta tolong membawanya ke balai polis. SP7 yang menaiki motokar bersama suaminya juga berhenti setelah dilambai oleh SP4/mangsa. Kedua-dua SP4 dan SP7 bersama suaminya telah menolong mangsa dengan membawa mangsa ke Balai Polis Bukit Naning dimana mangsa kemudian telah membuat satu laporan polis - exh. P2.
[31] SP4 menyatakan dia tidak kenal mangsa. Beliau mendapati mangsa dalam keadaan berlumpur; baju dan seluarnya berlumpur; hidungnya berdarah; gigi depan sumpek; mangsa menangis ketika minta tolong bawa jumpa polis. Bila ditanyakan kenapa, mangsa telah memberitahu SP4 bahawa dia telah kena
SP7
[32] SP7 pula menyatakan ketika suaminya memberhentikan keretanya beliau nampak mangsa bersama SP4. Bila ditanya apa yang terjadi, SP4 telah memberitahunya bahawa mangsa telah dirogol. Beliau melihat mangsa dalam keadaan menangis; rambutnya kusut masai; bibirnya berdarah dan bercakap dalam keadaan mengigil; dan pakaian mangsa dalam keadaan kotor.
[33] Saya berpendapat apa yang dilihat oleh SP4 dan SP7 merupakan keterangan corroboration yang paling kukuh yang menyokong keterangan mangsa tentang apa yang berlaku sekitar kejadian
[34] Selanjutnya mangsa telah memaklumkan kepada SP4 bahawa beliau telah dirogol oleh seseorang dengan memberikan nombor pendaftaran kenderaan perogol itu sekali "at the first available opportunity". Adalah trite bahawa perkara ini juga merupakan satu corroborative evidence yang amat bernilai - sila lihat PP v. Mardai [1949] 1 LNS 65.
SP8
[35] Keterangan pegawai penyiasat, SP8, mengesahkan lagi apa yang dilihat oleh SP4 dan SP7. SP8 melihat mangsa sejurus selepas mangsa membuat laporan polis.
[36] Menurut SP8 pada hari tersebut beliau bertugas di IPD Muar. Pada kira-kira jam 1.30 petang beliau telah dihubungi oleh SM Teo, Ketua Polis Balai Bakri, Muar berkenaan laporan yang dibuat oleh mangsa. Beliau telah mengarahkan supaya mangsa dibawa ke Balai Polis Muar untuk siasatan lanjut. Beliau telah menemui mangsa di Balai Polis Muar dan mendapati mangsa dalam keadaan berlumpur, tidak terurus; rambutnya kusut masai; dalam keadaan terkejut, ketakutan dan menangis; terdapat kesan-kesan calar dan luka dikaki; mangsa juga memberi nombor pendaftaran kenderaan yang dipandu oleh perogol, iaitu BBC 7714 dan juga jenis kenderaan tersebut.
[37] Seperti keterangan SP4 dan SP7 keterangan SP8 berkenaan dengan keadaan fizikal dan mental mangsa ketika melihat mangsa adalah juga keterangan corroborative yang amat kukuh bentuknya untuk menyokong keterangan mangsa tentang kejadian
[38] Dengan dipandu oleh mangsa SP8, telah ke tempat kejadian disatu lorong di dalam ladang kelapa sawit, Batu 12, Muar. Beliau mendapati tempat kejadian jaraknya kira-kira 100 meter dari jalan besar. Mangsa telah menunjukkan tempat di mana perbuatan
[39] Mangsa juga menyatakan dalam kereta yang dipandu oleh perayu tersebut terdapat tasbih yang digantung pada tangkai cermin pandang belakang kereta dan terdapat pelekat 'Persatuan Ketua Kampung Melaka' dilekatkan pada cermin hadapan kiri kereta. Perayu telah ditangkap pada 27 Ogos 1998 (kira-kira 1 minggu selepas kejadian) bersama dengan kereta dengan nombor pendaftaran BBC 7714 (exh. P18). SP8 telah memeriksa kereta dan beliau mendapati memang ada tasbih dan pelekat seperti dinyatakan oleh mangsa dalam kereta ini. Gambar-gambar tasbih dan pelekat ini adalah seperti gambar-gambar dalam exh. P6(g) dan P6(f). Lagi sekali penemuan ini merupakan keterangan corroborative yang kukuh yang menyokong keterangan mangsa bahawa perayu telah menggunakan kereta tersebut pada masa yang material berkenaan.
Ketiadaan Kecederaan Di Muka Dan Anggota Badan Bahagian Hadapan Mangsa
[40] Peguambela yang bijaksana berhujah bahawa SP6 tidak menyatakan mangsa mengalami luka dimuka dan bahagian-bahagian hadapan badan lain walaupun mangsa telah ditumbuk berkali-kali dibahagian-bahagian badan tersebut. Juga tiada kesan-kesan calar di muka walaupun muka mangsa telah ditumbuk oleh perayu hingga cermin mata yang dipakai patah. Ini menunjukkan mangsa tidak bercakap benar.
[41] Namun SP4 menyatakan beliau nampak hidung mangsa berdarah dan SP7 juga menyatakan beliau nampak bibir mangsa luka dan berdarah. Kedua-dua saksi ini nampak mangsa sejurus selepas kejadian
[42] SP8 telah menemui pecahan cermin mata yang patah (exh. P1) ditempat kejadian. Ini merupakan fakta kuat yang menunjukkan mangsa memberi keterangan yang benar. Mangsa tidak menyatakan cerminnya patah akibat ditumbuk di muka oleh perayu tetapi cermin mata itu patah akibat mukanya ditekan oleh perayu bersama dengan tudung yang dipakai. Perihal tiadanya kesan tumbukan dibahagian hadapan badan mangsa adalah sesuatu yang relatif. Ianya bergantung kepada berapa kuat tumbukan dan dibahagian mana tumbukan itu dilepaskan. Dalam situasi yang amat mencemaskan mangsa tidak dapat memberikan kepastian dibahagian mana tumbukan-tumbukan itu telah ditujukan. Faktor ini tidak sekali-kali menunjukkan bahawa mangsa tidak bercakap benar kerana wujud banyak keterangan-keterangan sokongan lain yang menyokong keterangan mangsa bahawa beliau telah dirogol oleh perayu seperti dihuraikan diperenggan-perenggan di atas.
Baju Dan Coli Mangsa Tidak Koyak
[43] Sekali lagi peguambela yang bijaksana menghujah baju dan coli tidak koyak walaupun ditanggalkan oleh perayu dengan paksa menunjukkan mangsa tidak bercakap benar. Sehubungan dengannya saya bersetuju dengan hujah TPR yang bijaksana bahawa peguambela menyimpan pandangan bahawa kalau tumbuk mesti cedera, kalau baju ditarik mesti koyak. Hujahan peguambela adalah hujahan yang simplistik. Hujahan itu tidak mengambilkira berapa lama baju ditarik, kekuatan baju ditarik, jenis kekenyalan fabrik, darjah resistance mangsa, kedudukan mangsa ketika baju ditanggalkan dan perkara-perkara relatif yang lain. Mangsa menyatakan coli dan baju tidak koyak kerana ditarik/tanggalkan melalui lehernya. Semasa baju ditarik untuk ditanggalkan colinya ikut tertarik dan sama tertanggal. Penjelasan ini adalah munasabah. Walau apapun tiada hukum fizik yang menyatakan kalau baju ditarik baju itu semestinya akan koyak. Kebarangkalian (probability) untuk koyak adalah tinggi tapi pada hakikatnya baju/coli itu tidak koyak. Hakikat ini wajar diterima tanpa perlu menimbangkan secara berlebihan akan unsur-unsur kebarangkaliannya.
Gigi Patah
[44] Mangsa menyatakan beliau perasan gigi depannya patah ketika membasuh muka di balai polis. Namun beliau juga tidak perasan bila masanya giginya itu patah. Peguambela yang bijaksana menghujah bahawa SP6 tidak menyatakan mulut mangsa tidak bengkak sungguhpun gigi depannya patah. SP6 juga tidak tahu bila gigi tersebut patah. Mangsa juga tidak dihantar kepada pakar gigi untuk menentukan bila gigi itu patah. Maka peguambela merumuskan wujud keraguan yang serious samada gigi itu patah sebelum kejadian
[45] Lagi sekali peguambela yang bijaksana mengunjurkan kalau gigi patah mulut mesti bengkak. Adakah itu norma yang terpakai? Saya fikir tidak. Semestinya ada kecualian dan keadaan dimana seseorang itu tidak semestinya mengalami mulut bengkak jika gigi patah. Walau apa pun SP7 melihat bibir mangsa berdarah. Keterangan ini tidak dicabar. Ini menunjukkan adanya kaitan antara gigi patah dengan mulut berdarah. Keterangan mangsa bahawa giginya patah akibat kejadian
[46] Walau apapun gigi patah bukanlah ingredient kesalahan
Percanggahan Laporan P8 Dimana Mangsa Menyatakan Beliau Telah Dirogol 2 Kali - Satu Kali Dalam Kereta Dan Kali Kedua Di Atas Tanah Di Ladang Kelapa Sawit
[47] Peguambela yang bijaksana menghujah mangsa, dalam keterangannya di mahkamah tidak pernah menyatakan bahawa beliau telah dirogol sebanyak dua kali. Maka ini adalah bercanggah dengan apa yang beliau lapurkan kepada SP6 seperti yang tercatit dalam laporan perubatan - exh. P8 di atas. Percanggahan ini tidak boleh diketepikan begitu sahaja.
[48] Saya telah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan mangsa dan mendapati bahawa isu ini tidak pernah dibentangkan kepada mangsa semasa mangsa disoalbalas oleh pembelaan. Begitu juga dengan SP6. Dengan itu mangsa tidak berpeluang untuk mengklarifikasikan percanggahan ini serta menyatakan berapa kali sebenarnya beliau telah dirogol. Namun begitu keterangan beliau di mahkamah amat mantap dan tegas bahawa beliau dirogol satu kali sahaja oleh perayu di atas tanah dibawah pokok kelapa sawit. Keterangan mangsa ini diperkuatkan oleh laporan polisnya sendiri (exh. P2) yang dibuat sebelum beliau diperiksa oleh SP6. Laporan polisnya (di ms 529, Vol. 3, RR) juga merujuk bahawa beliau dirogol hanya satu kali sahaja. Menurut laporan polisnya, apa yang berlaku dalam kereta ialah "... Lelaki itu kemudian berhentikan keretanya dan cuba merogol saya dalam kereta ..." Keterangan mangsa di mahkamah adalah konsisten dengan kenyataan ini bila mangsa menyatakan perayu telah berjaya menanggalkan baju dan coli yang dipakai dan kemudiannya berjaya membuka zip seluar jeansnya lalu menindih mangsa. Perbuatan ini adalah perbuatan yang boleh dikategorikan sebagai percubaan untuk merogol. Dalam hal keadaan keseluruhan kes ini, saya berpendapat kredibiliti mangsa tidak langsung terjejas oleh percanggahan seperti yang dihujahkan oleh peguambela yang bijaksana. Lebih-lebih lagi bila keterangan SP6 bukan keterangan substantive.
Tempoh Masa
[49] Peguambela yang bijaksana seterusnya menghujah bahawa mangsa menyatakan insiden
Ketiadaan Spermatozoa Dalam Vagina Mangsa
[50] Dalam perbicaraan pertama kali dahulu sebelum Mahkamah Tinggi memerintahkan perbicaraan semula (retrial) kes ini peguambela yang bijaksana menghujah mangsa menyatakan bahawa perayu telah memancutkan air maninya dalam vaginanya tetapi dalam perbicaraan sekarang mangsa menyatakan perayu telah memancutkan air maninya di luar vaginanya. Menurut peguambela, percanggahan ini adalah ketara sekali yang menjejaskan kredibiliti mangsa.
[51] Dalam penjelasannya mangsa menyatakan ketika memberi keterangan dalam perbicaraan yang pertama dahulu, beliau belum berkahwin dan beliau tidak faham serta keliru tentang apa yang dimaksudkan di dalam/diluar vagina. Dalam perbicaraan kali kedua ini beliau sudah berkahwin dan faham sepenuhnya maksud di dalam/di luar vagina dan bertegas bahawa ejakulasi itu berlaku diluar vagina. Saya mendapati penjelasan ini adalah penjelasan yang munasabah. Tiada apa-apa yang inherently improbable dalam penjelasan ini.
[52] Peguambela yang bijaksana seterusnya menghujah laporan perubatan exh. P8 dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa intravaginal swab telah diambil tetapi tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan wujudnya spermatozoa. Ini dengan sendiri menimbulkan keraguan samada perbuatan
[53] Walaubagaimana pun saya berpendapat ini adalah sesuatu yang memang dijangka kerana mangsa menyatakan ejakulasi itu berlaku diluar vagina/kemaluannya dan selepas perayu beredar dari tempat kejadian beliau telah membasuh air mani diluar vaginanya itu dan juga yang meleket di kaki disatu lopak air di tempat kejadian. Dalam keadaan sebegini memang kesan air mani tidak akan wujud di dalam vagina mangsa. Maka tidak ada asas untuk membuat adverse findings berkaitan dengan ketiadaan air mani dalam vagina mangsa.
[54] Kehadiran air mani dalam vagina mangsa bukanlah "ingredient of the offence" yang perlu dibuktikan. Ingredient asas adalah identiti perogol dan kemasukan zakar pemohon ke dalam vagina mangsa. Kemasukan zakar yang sedikit (slightest) pun sudah mencukupi untuk constitute kesalahan
Keterangan Saksi Pakar Pembelaan, SD1
[55] SD1 datang ke mahkamah dan dengan nyaringnya menyatakan pemeriksaan yang dilaksanakan oleh SP2 dan SP6 semua tidak betul dan dia seoranglah yang betul dan
[56] SD1 juga mengakui, SP6 adalah seorang doktor yang berkelayakan dari sebuah universiti perubatan yang unggul. Beliau juga mengakui SP6 sememangnya layak untuk membuat pemeriksaan ke atas mangsa.
[57] Saya telah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan SP6 dan laporan perubatannya, exh. P8 secara cermat dan saya mendapati tiada cacat celanya. Beliau bukannya merawat dan tidak merawat mangsa kerana mangsa mengalami penyakit yang tenat, kronik atau serious, yang memerlukan kepakaran sakit puan yang khusus lagi mendalam. Beliau hanya diminta oleh pegawai penyiasat untuk memeriksa mangsa bagi menyiasat samada keterangan mangsa bahawa mangsa telah dirogol mempunyai asas serta boleh dipertahankan dari aspek klinikal. Ini saya kira adalah kerja yang mudah dan saya tidak nampak kenapa SP6 dikatakan tidak layak untuk membuat kerja mudah ini dan dapatan-dapatannya dikatakan tidak betul.
[58] Hasil daripada pemeriksaannya SP6 mendapati abrasi baru pada posterior fourchette dan koyakan baru pada selaput dara mangsa dan koyakan ini boleh berpunca dari kemasukan zakar atau jari atau objek-objek tumpul yang lain. SP6 tidak pernah menyatakan mangsa telah dirogol. Bukan tugas SP6 untuk menyatakan serta mendapati mangsa telah dirogol. Demikian juga bukan tugas SD1 untuk menyatakan mangsa telah dirogol atau tidak dirogol. Tugas untuk mendapati samada mangsa telah dirogol atau tidak dirogol, dipikul sepenuhnya oleh mahkamah. Mahkamah dalam menjalankan tugasannya akan berteraskan kepada segala keterangan yang dihimpunkan dihadapannya. Dengan itu tidak ada asas yang kukuh untuk mengenepikan dapatan SP6 hasil dari pemeriksaannya ke atas mangsa kerana beliau hanya menyatakan apa yang beliau dapati atas jasad fizikal mangsa.
[59] Sehubungan dengan keterangan SD1, Hakim Sesyen yang bijaksana telah menyatakan di ms. 245 RR:
Mahkamah berpendapat keterangan DW-1 adalah hanya pandangannya hanya tertumpu kepada report P-8 sahaja. Beliau tidak melihat mangsa dan berpeluang memeriksa mangsa. Beliau sendiri tidak menafikan bahawa dari laporan P-8 memang jelas ada koyakan baru dalam kemaluan mangsa dan bermaksud ia disebabkan oleh kemasukkan sesuatu. Pendapat yang diberikan mungkin boleh dipertikaikan kerana beliau tidak ada pengetahuan keterangan sokongan lain dari saksi berkaitan yang mana keterangan mereka menjuruskan kesimpulan bahawa tertuduh terlibat.
[60] Saya bersetuju sungguh dengan pendapat ini dan atas segala keterangan yang ada Hakim Sesyen tidak khilaf bila beliau menolak keterangan SD1.
Ketiadaan Ujian Potensi (Potency Test)
[61] Peguambela yang bijaksana menghujah bahawa ketiadaan ujian ini atas perayu telah mewujudkan lompang dimana pendakwaan gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa perayu berkeupayaan untuk melakukan perbuatan
Keterangan SD2
[62] SD2 adalah ayah perayu. Beliau adalah pemilik kereta BBC 7714 dimana kereta tersebut telah didaftarkan di atas namanya. Maka peguambela yang bijaksana menghujah oleh kerana kereta ini milik SD2 dan sentiasa dalam milikan SD2, semestinya ia mengundang persoalan siapa identiti perogol yang menggunakan kereta tersebut pada hari kejadian.
[63] Namun identiti perogol iaitu perayu tidak pernah menjadi isu dengan mangsa. Keterangan mangsa bahawa perayulah yang memandu/membawa kereta tersebut pada hari dan waktu kejadian tidak dicabar oleh pembelaan. Demikian juga keterangan mangsa bahawa perayulah yang telah merogol beliau juga tidak tercabar dan keterangannya "intact" hingga akhir kes. Perayu telah ditangkap oleh polis satu minggu selepas kejadian berpandukan kepada maklumat nombor pendaftaran kereta tersebut yang dibekalkan oleh mangsa kepada polis. Pada hari perayu ditangkap kereta berkenaan nyata ada dalam milikan perayu. Nexusnya amat jelas iaitu perayulah yang membawa kereta berkenaan pada hari kejadian.
[64] Selanjutnya nampaknya SD2 mempunyai memori yang berpilih-pilih. Beliau memilih untuk mengingati siapa yang membawa keretanya dan pergerakan kereta pada 27 Ogos 1998, iaitu pada hari perayu ditangkap tetapi memilih untuk tidak mengingati siapa yang membawa keretanya pada 21 Ogos 1998 iaitu pada hari kejadian
[65] Walau bagaimanapun keterangan SD2 ini telah ditangani dengan betul oleh Hakim Sesyen yang bijaksana setelah beliau melihat dan mendengar sendiri SD2 seperti diluahk an di ms 246 RR. Beliau tidak khilaf dalam dapatannya dan tidak ada asas bagi saya untuk menganggu dapatan ini.
Percanggahan Keterangan SP4 Dan SP7
[66] Peguambela yang bijaksana menghujah mangsa dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa beliaulah yang menahan kereta yang ditumpang oleh SP7 manakala SP4 pula menyatakan beliaulah yang telah menahan kereta berkenaan. Maka wujud percanggahan yang material dalam keterangan-keterangan tersebut. Saya berpendapat ini adalah satu isu remeh yang dibesar-besarkan dan isu ini tidak membawa kesan kepada kes pendakwaan. Apa yang material ialah kedua-dua SP4 dan SP7 telah berhenti membantu mangsa dan melihat keadaan fizikal dan mental mangsa sejurus selepas mangsa dirogol.
[67] Demikian juga perihal mangsa tidak "at the first opportunity" memberitahu SP4 bahawa beliau telah dirogol tetapi SP4 lah yang dahulu bertanya apa yang berlaku, tidak mengubah apa-apa fakta bahawa mangsa telah memberitahu SP4 bahawa beliau telah dirogol pada kesempatan yang pertama. Tidak kiralah siapa yang tanya dulu atau siapa yang beritahu dahulu.
Keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat SP8
[68] Peguambela yang bijaksana juga telah membangkitkan kecacatan dalam keterangan SP8 bila SP8 tidak menyatakan wujudnya kesan tayar di tempat kejadian, ada atau tidak tanah dalam kereta berkenaan; kerosakan pada dash-board kereta; tiada rambut perayu dalam kereta, pecahan cermin mata di luar kereta; dan ketiadaan lopak air dalam rajah kasar. Saya berpendapat perkara-perkara ini tidak mencacatkan kes pendakwaan memandangkan penemuan-penemuan lain yang diperolehi oleh SP8 yang lebih releven seperti dihuraikan dalam perenggan-perenggan yang terdahulu. Apa yang amat penting ialah mangsa telah mengecam nombor pendaftaran kereta berkenaan dan satu minggu kemudian perayu telah ditangkap hasil daripada maklumat tersebut. Selepas perayu ditangkap mangsa terus mengecam perayu sebagai orang yang merogolnya.
Laporan Kimia, Exh. P19
[69] Baju T, coli dan seluar jeans yang dipakai oleh mangsa dihari kejadian telah dihantar kepada Jabatan Kimia oleh pendakwaan. Laporan kimia adalah seperti exh. P19. Peguambela yang bijaksana telah menarik perhatian mahkamah bahawa laporan tersebut mengesahkan bahawa tidak ada kesan darah ataupun air mani pada ketiga-tiga pakaian tersebut. Ini memungkinkan kejadian
[70] Walaubagaimana pun mangsa menyatakan ketika dirogol beliau ditelanjangkan sepenuhnya oleh perayu dan ejakulasi berlaku diluar kemaluannya. Beliau kemudiannya membasuh kesan air mani yang melekat pada badannya. Dalam keadaan sebegini ketiadaan kesan air mani pada pakaian-pakaian mangsa adalah sesuatu yang dijangkakan dan munasabah sekali.
[71] Berhubung dengan kesan darah pula, saksi SP4 dan SP7 nampak darah dibibir dan dihidung mangsa. Ini menunjukkan adanya "violence" dikenakan oleh perayu ke atas mangsa seperti dihuraikan diperenggan-perenggan di atas. Mangsa tidak disembelih atau dilukakan dengan senjata tajam atau mengalami kecederaan yang serious hingga menyebabkan pendarahan yang teruk. Maka ketiadaan kesan darah pada pakaian-pakaian mangsa adalah sesuatu yang munasabah.
[72] Pada pandangan saya laporan kimia berkenaan tidak langsung menjejaskan kredibiliti mangsa mahupun menjejaskan kes pendakwaan kerana wujudnya keterangan-keterangan corroborative lain yang cukup kukuh.
Kawad Cam
[73] Peguambela yang bijaksana mengadu umur peserta kawad cam tidak sama dengan umur pengadu yang ketika itu berumur 31 tahun, pegawai yang mengendalikan kawad cam (SP5) tidak merekodkan ketinggian dan ciri-ciri fizikal peserta-peserta serta tidak mengambil langkah supaya mangsa tidak melihat perayu sebelum kawad cam dijalankan.
[74] Namun keterangan oleh SP5 menunjukkan bahawa semua 10 peserta kawad cam adalah berbangsa Melayu yang mempunyai warna kulit yang sama dan mempunyai ketinggian yang sama. Biliknya ditingkat satu dan sebelum kawad cam, mangsa ada dibilik khas disebelah biliknya. Sebelum kawad cam perayu berada di bilik lokap yang berada di tingkat bawah. Sesi kawad cam diadakan di Kelab Pegawai Rendah, yang terletak dalam bangunan lain. Mangsa tidak nampak perayu semasa dibawa ke bangunan tersebut kerana perayu dibawa melalui jalan lain. Secara purata kebanyakan umur peserta seimbang dengan umur perayu.
[75] Adalah tidak munasabah untuk mencari para peserta yang sama umur, sama tinggi, sama wajah, sama warna kulit dan mempunyai ciri-ciri fizikal yang sama dengan perayu. Isu-isu bahawa mangsa dapat melihat perayu semasa perayu dibawa ke bilik kawad cam; tangan perayu tidak digari semasa dibawa ke bilik kawad cam; SP5 tidak menerangkan prosidur kawad cam kepada perayu; perayu memohon untuk tukar posisi selepas pengecaman pertama oleh mangsa tetapi tidak dibenarkan oleh SP5; perayu tidak dibenarkan tukar pakaian dan perayu telah membangkitkan bantahan tentang proses kawad cam tersebut yang kesemuanya dinafikan oleh PW5 hanyalah put question sahaja. Ia tidak menjadi sebahagian daripada keterangan substantive melainkan perayu memilih untuk memberi keterangan berkenaan dengan isu-isu yang sama-sama dan apa yang dikatakan oleh perayu itu didapati benar dan diterima oleh mahkamah.
[76] Saya berpendapat bahawa SP5 telah berusaha untuk mengendalikan sesi kawad cam itu dengan adil dan pengecaman perayu oleh mangsa dalam kawad cam tersebut adalah teratur. Keseluruhan insiden tersebut dari mula mangsa masuk kereta perayu hinggalah perayu meninggalkan mangsa di ladang sawit tersebut berlangsung kira-kira satu jam. Ia berlaku disiang hari bermula dari kira-kira jam 11.30 pagi. Maka cuaca adalah cukup terang dan baik. Mangsa telah berbual-bual dengan perayu sepanjang perjalanan. Mangsa telah melihat wajah perayu. Juga berlaku pergelutan di dalam dan di luar kereta dan perayu berada di atas mangsa semasa kejadian
[77] Jikalau pun pengecaman dalam kawad cam itu telah dikendalikan dengan cara yang tidak adil kepada perayu, namun masih ada 'dock identification' dimana mangsa telah juga mengecam perayu dengan positif sebagai orang yang telah merogolnya. Adalah trite bahawa dock identification adalah sama material dan releven dengan pengecaman dalam kawad cam. Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Ong Poh Cheng v. PP [1998] 4 CLJ 1, telah memutuskan di keputusan No. 2(a) di ms. 2:
It did hot follow, as a matter of course, that just because the learned judge rejected the identification at the identification parade, he must of necessity also reject the dock identification of the appellant. The facts showed that the identification thereof was rejected not because there was no identification of the appellant as the robber but because there was defect in the conduct of the parade. That being so, his rejection of the evidence at the identification parade was in no way fatal to the dock identification of the appellant as the robber.
[78] Sila juga lihat Arumugam Muthusamy v. PP [1998] 3 CLJ 597. Dalam keseluruhan keadaan kes ini saya berpendapat identiti perayu dan pengecaman perayu oleh mangsa sebagai orang yang telah merogol beliau tidak menjadi isu langsung. Pengecaman perayu oleh mangsa adalah pengecaman yang mantap yang tidak menimbulkan keraguan langsung.
Hukuman
[79] Perayu telah dijatuhi hukuman penjara selama 16 tahun dan dikenakan 10 kali sebatan dengan rotan. Di ms 247, Hakim Sesyen yang bijaksana telah menghuraikan faktor-faktor yang diambilkira dalam menjatuhkan hukuman tersebut. Saya berpendapat beliau telah mengambilkira segala faktor yang patut diambilkira ketika menjatuhkan hukuman tersebut. Pihak pembelaan telah gagal untuk menunjukkan dimana Hakim Sesyen berkenaan telah khilaf dalam menjatuhkan hukuman berkenaan. Dengan itu saya menolak rayuan perayu dan mengekalkan hukuman yang telah dijatuhkan tersebut.
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